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THE EFFECTS OF DIRECTIONAL AUDIT GUIDANCE AND ESTIMATION
UNCERTAINTY ON AUDITOR CONFIRMATION BIAS AND PROFESSIONAL
SKEPTICISM WHEN EVALUATING FAIR VALUE ESTIMATES
NORMA R. MONTAGUE
ABSTRACT

In this study, I examine the effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty
on auditors’ confirmation bias and professional skepticism when evaluating fair value
estimates. Fair value estimation is becoming more prevalent in financial reporting
frameworks, and regulators warn that fair value estimation presents higher risk of
material misstatement when greater judgment in estimation is involved. In addition recent
evidence from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) indicates that
some auditors may not be exercising sufficient professional skepticism when performing
audit procedures in higher risk areas of the audit. Martin et al. (2006) suggest that it may
be the audit standards themselves that orient auditors toward biased evaluation of
management’s estimates, suggesting that such directional audit guidance leads to
confirmation bias. Further, it is possible that because of auditors’ intolerance for
ambiguity, that a greater degree of estimation uncertainty exacerbates the bias. Thus, I
examine whether directional audit guidance (e.g., support management’s estimate, and
oppose management’s estimate) versus non-directional audit guidance (e.g., develop own
estimate) affects auditors’ confirmation bias differentially under varying degrees of
vii

uncertainty (e.g., low vs. high), and the extent to which this bias increases or decreases
professional skepticism. The results show that auditors exhibit the greatest confirmation
bias when they are directed to oppose versus support management’s estimate or generate
their own estimate, and that this bias increases the degree of professional skepticism
exercised by auditors. Further, the greatest extent of confirmation bias resulted when
auditors were directed to oppose management’s estimate and estimation uncertainty was
high. This study sheds light on the effects of directional versus non-directional audit
guidance in the presence of uncertainty and should be informative to standard setters and
practitioners as they press forward in issuing new audit guidance related to the evaluation
of fair value estimates.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Recent movements towards increased fair value reporting have brought into
question the reliability1 of fair value estimates, and consequently, the adequacy of audit
guidance supporting the review of these estimates (e.g., International Standard on
Auditing (ISA) 540). “In general, the U. S.-based research evidence suggests that
disclosed fair value estimates for financial instruments include differing levels of
reliability and that the variation in reliability is related to the extent to which fair value
estimates include publicly observed markets-based information versus managementproduced fair value estimates” (AAA FASC 2005, 190). These findings validate a
concern regarding potential for biased (i.e., unreliable) values, particularly as
management applies a high degree of discretion in determining the fair value estimate.
Potential costs, such as investor losses, associated with biased reporting (whether
intentional or unintentional) underscore the need for independent auditors to objectively
assess management’s estimates. Given that objective evaluation of evidence requires the
auditor to exercise professional skepticism (AICPA 1997), it is imperative to examine
whether auditors exercise professional skepticism in their evaluation of fair value
estimates. It is also important to examine the guidance provided to auditors for examining
fair values and to investigate unintentional consequences of such guidance.

1

Schipper (2005) defines reliability in terms of the FASB’s conceptual framework, as a combination of
both verifiability and representational faithfulness. I use the terms “bias” and “reliability” interchangeably
in regards to the representational faithfulness of the fair value estimate.
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Historically, we have relied on the audit function to enhance the reliability of
management judgment as used in financial reporting; however, prior research shows that
auditors are subject to their own biases when reviewing information received from
management (Kennedy 1993, 1995; McDaniel and Kinney 1995; Earley et al. 2008). In
practice, auditors typically receive summary information from management about
account balances and financial disclosures. The auditors then must gather evidence
regarding management’s reported values and disclosures to attest to the fairness of the
information presented. In this process, management can be considered the “first mover”
and the auditor the “second mover” (Earley et al. 2008), signifying that the auditor is
predisposed to management’s values, thus making it more difficult for the auditor to
make objective evaluations. This sequence of events can be particularly problematic
when management’s reported values are optimistically biased, as can be the case with fair
value estimates (Ramanna 2008; Mazza et al. 2008). Therefore it becomes imperative to
evaluate the competence and objectivity of auditors who are charged with evaluating
management’s fair value estimates (Martin et al. 2006; Penman 2007), as well as the
extent to which auditors exercise professional skepticism when evaluating these
estimates.
Prior research shows that auditors suffer from various biases when making
judgments about events with uncertain outcomes. For example, auditors have been shown
to exhibit recency bias (e.g., Kennedy 1993), curse of knowledge bias (e.g., Kennedy
1995), and confirmation bias (e.g., Kida 1984) in making going concern judgments.
Research, however, has not investigated whether these biases manifest in evaluating fair
value estimates. Fair value estimates present a challenge for auditors because of the
2

uncertainty involved in their estimation, and are unique from other estimates primarily
because of their measurement objective. The measurement objective of many accounting
estimates is to forecast the outcome of one or more transactions, events or conditions
giving rise to the need for the accounting estimate (e.g., bad debts expense and contingent
liabilities) (IAASB 2009). By comparison, the measurement objective of many fair value
estimates is expressed in terms of the value of a current transaction or financial statement
item based on market prices at the measurement date (IAASB 2009, 4). 2 Earley et al.
(2008, 1463) classify fair value estimation as a “more unstructured” task because, unlike
other tasks where the auditor can ultimately receive feedback about actual outcomes, the
actual outcome of fair value estimation might not be available at the time of the audit
report. Feedback regarding actual outcomes is difficult to discern as “any observed
outcome is invariably affected by events or conditions subsequent to the date at which the
measurement is estimated for purposes of the financial statements” (IAASB 2009, 5).
Thus, errors in fair value estimations may go undetected until some time after the
issuance of the audit report, if at all.
Fair value estimates are also unique from other accounting estimates due to the
potential complexity involved in their estimation and the numerous assumptions that
management makes in deriving these estimates. Additionally, due to the first
mover/second mover effect, auditors do not evaluate the fair value estimates
independently of management’s assumptions, allowing bias seeded in management’s
assumptions to persist should the auditor fail to exercise sufficient professional
skepticism. Currently, over 40 accounting standards within GAAP require or permit
2

The applicable reporting framework may require fair value measurement based on an assumed
hypothetical current transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction,
rather than the settlement of a transaction at some past or future date (IAASB 2009, 4).
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entities to use fair value measures (FASB 2006b), and as fair value becomes more
prevalent in financial reporting biased estimations will have an increasingly pervasive
effect on the overall fairness of the financial statements.
In addressing the complexity involved in fair value estimation, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 157 (FAS 157), Fair Value Measurements, which provides guidance for
measuring and reporting fair value estimates (FVEs) in the financial statements and
accompanying footnotes. While other standards have addressed fair value measurement,
none has done so with as much specificity as FAS 157. FAS 157 is unique in the
accounting literature in introducing and formalizing this estimate relative to other types
of estimates (e.g., bad debts) (Trott 2009). Specifically, as part of its measurement
framework, FAS 157 provides a fair value hierarchy that distinguishes between
observable and unobservable inputs and recommends that valuation techniques should
maximize the use of observable inputs and minimize the use of unobservable inputs
(FASB 2006a, 10). Observable inputs are those that are based on market inputs obtained
from sources independent of the entity, whereas unobservable inputs involve the entity’s
own assessment of the market participants’ assumptions. The emphasis of FAS 157 on
observable inputs is designed to curb both management’s incentive and opportunity to
bias FVEs. However, as transactions requiring FVEs increase in uniqueness and
complexity, management relies solely on its own assumptions in arriving at a FVE,
increasing the opportunity for management bias. Management bias is defined in ISA 540
as “a lack of neutrality by management in the preparation of information” (IAASB 2009,

4

5). Thus, management may intentionally or unintentionally bias the fair value estimate
either upwards or downwards.
The nature and reliability of information available to management when making
fair value estimates varies widely, which consequently affects the degree of estimation
uncertainty associated with such estimates (IAASB 2009). ISA 540 defines estimation
uncertainty as “the susceptibility of an accounting estimate and related disclosures to an
inherent lack of precision in its measurement” (IAASB 2009, 5). The degree of
estimation uncertainty (hereafter, uncertainty), provides for a greater range of judgments
allowing for increased susceptibility to management bias; this, in turn, enhances the risk
of material misstatement of accounting estimates (AICPA 2001; IAASB 2009; PCAOB
2009).
Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Standing
Advisory Group (SAG) disclosed that “information obtained from the PCAOB’s
inspection and enforcement programs indicates that some auditors might not be
exercising sufficient professional skepticism when performing audit procedures and
evaluating results in higher risk areas of the audit” (PCAOB 2009, 2). Professional
skepticism, which requires the auditor to adopt an attitude that includes a questioning
mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence, is indicated by auditor judgments and
decisions that reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect
(AICPA 1997; Nelson 2009). One way professional skepticism is reflected in a fair value
setting is by the auditor’s judgment that management’s FVE is materially misstated, and
the auditor’s decision to adjust the dollar amount of the reported value in a downward
(conservative) direction.
5

Martin et al. (2006) suggest that it could be audit standards themselves which
orient auditors toward biased evaluation of management estimates, resulting in
insufficient professional skepticism. For example, AU Sec. 332.35, Auditing Derivative
Instruments, Hedging Activities, and Investment in Securities, states that “the auditor
should obtain evidence supporting management’s assertions about the fair value of
derivatives and securities measured or disclosed at fair value” (AICPA 2000, emphasis
added). Martin et al. (2006) suggest that directional guidance such as this could lead to a
“confirmation bias” wherein the auditor searches for and gives greater weight to
information that supports management’s estimates at the expense of relevant information
that disconfirms management’s estimates. Kadous et al. (2008) note that “despite the
prevalence of confirmation bias across decision settings and its potentially hazardous
consequences, few studies have sought to identify situations in which confirmation bias is
mitigated” (139). Following Kadous et al. (2008), Nelson (2009) suggests that future
research should explore the underlying reasons for the prevalence of confirmation bias in
auditing and calls for research investigating whether confirmation bias can be exploited
in such a way as to promote professional skepticism via relatively simple means; i.e.,
reframing of the standards and professional guidance.
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions
The purposes of this paper are to examine whether current (as well as alternate)
audit guidance and uncertainty magnify confirmation bias in auditors and the extent to
which this bias increases or decreases professional skepticism. Specifically, I examine
whether directional audit guidance (i.e., support/oppose management’s estimate) versus
non-directional audit guidance (i.e., develop own estimate) affects auditors’ confirmation
6

bias differentially under varying levels of uncertainty (i.e., low vs. high), and how this
bias consequently affects professional skepticism.
The research questions are:
(1) To what extent do auditors exhibit confirmation bias in evaluating
management’s fair value estimates under directional and non-directional audit
standards?
(2) To what extent does estimation uncertainty affect the extent of confirmation
bias exhibited by auditors when evaluating management’s fair value
estimates?
(3) Do the effects of audit guidance on confirmation bias depend on the extent of
estimation uncertainty inherent in management’s fair value estimate?
(4) Does confirmation bias affect the extent of professional skepticism exercised
by auditors when evaluating management’s fair value estimates?
1.3 Motivation
The role of auditors requires judgment during all phases of the audit, including
planning, information gathering, and evaluation. Low-quality judgments can have serious
consequences not only for auditors, but also for their firms, individuals relying on the
work of the auditors, society and the economy as a whole (Bonner 2008). For example,
Nelson (2009) notes that lack of professional skepticism has been identified as a primary
cause of audit failure (Carmichael and Craig 1996), a contributor to the majority of SEC
enforcement actions (Beasley et al. 2001), and a primary contributor to malpractice
claims against auditors (Anderson and Wolfe 2002). Thus, it is important to investigate
factors, such as audit guidance and uncertainty, which could potentially impair the quality
7

of judgments. This research is timely and relevant as indicated by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) Standing Advisory Group (SAG) recent
meeting to discuss the potential of a standards-setting project on auditing fair value
measurements (PCAOB 2009).
Auditors’ ability to objectively evaluate management’s FVEs is important for
several reasons. First, inability to objectively evaluate management’s FVEs limits the
extent to which users can rely on the corresponding financial statements. In the case of
management-biased estimates, an orientation towards confirming evidence by the auditor
increases the likelihood of undesirable outcomes because “potential risks and warning
signals may be overlooked” (Jonas et al. 2001, 557). Second, lack of objectivity can
expose the auditor to legal penalties as well as reputational losses. Third, if current audit
guidance encourages auditors to engage in confirmation bias, it then becomes instructive
for standard setters to know whether alternate wording can potentially mitigate this bias
or alternatively exploit the bias in such a way as to increase professional skepticism
(Nelson 2009). Lastly, given that FVEs vary in the degree of estimation uncertainty, and
thereby risk of material misstatement, it is important to know how this uncertainty
influences auditors’ propensities toward exhibiting confirmation bias under current and
alternate audit guidance, in addition to its underlying effects on professional skepticism.
Research investigating likely sources of auditor biases and errors when auditing
fair value estimates is critical to maintaining the value and integrity of the audit. Of equal
import is critical evaluation of the standards put forth by regulatory bodies to guide the
auditor in evaluating the reasonableness of management’s FVEs. As noted previously,
AU Sec. 332.35 states that the auditor should obtain evidence supporting management’s
8

assertions about the fair value of derivatives (AICPA 2000). Martin et al. (2006) warn
that “auditors must be careful not to simply search for evidence that corroborates
management’s estimates, even though current audit guidance specifies that very
approach” (289). They suggest that corroborative evidence can be readily and rather
easily attained if that is the only evidence pursued. Instead, Martin et al. (2006) suggest
that auditors should also consider information that could potentially disconfirm
management’s assertions. Performing a more balanced search for information requires
individuals to exert more effort, making them more attentive to relevant cues and
allowing them to process information more deeply (Kunda 1990). Thus, simple strategies
such as reframing of the standards could be effective in reducing confirmation bias in
auditors. Furthermore, focusing on disconfirming evidence could potentially serve to
increase professional skepticism exercised in the evaluation of FVEs.
While the study of confirmation bias has a sound foundation in psychology
literature, it remains important to examine and understand the phenomenon in accounting
settings. Kida (1984) notes that most of the work on confirmatory strategies in
psychology focuses on the areas of person perception, social interaction, and
stereotyping, with students used as the primary subjects. It is questionable as to whether
findings in psychology generalize to audit settings as the tasks required of audit
professionals entail fundamentally different cognitive strategies in working problems
related to their expertise (Joyce and Biddle 1981). The accounting setting differs from
general settings not only with regard to levels of education and experience but also
because accounting professionals are subject to regulatory constraints and are held
accountable to multiple constituents. These circumstances would seemingly work to
9

discourage confirmation bias as accounting professionals would be motivated to be
accurate in order to avoid professional and legal scrutiny from regulators and other
stakeholders. Prior research, however, has demonstrated that confirmation bias does exist
in a variety of accounting settings, particularly the tax setting (e.g., Cloyd & Spilker
1999, 2000; Kadous et al. 2008). However, Kadous et al. (2008) note that prior findings
related to confirmation bias in a tax setting do not generalize to all accounting situations.
Specifically, the authors assert that the finding that confirmation bias in tax preparers is
significantly reduced for high-risk clients demonstrates that confirmation bias previously
observed in low-risk settings does not generalize to high-risk settings, where it would be
of most concern. Fair value auditing could potentially be an area of high risk for auditors
because of the uncertainty involved in both deriving and auditing fair value estimates.
The mixed evidence noted in the tax literature, as well as fundamental differences
between the tax and audit settings (discussed below), precludes drawing any conclusions
relative to the audit environment. These factors provide motivation for investigating
whether confirmation bias in auditors is affected by the extent of uncertainty (thereby,
risk) inherent in management’s FVE.
While the tax setting provides a rich environment for confirmation bias to arise,
because of the client advocacy role that tax professionals assume when they are retained
by the client it is not known whether findings from the tax literature will generalize to the
audit setting. Like tax professionals, auditors must often search through a great deal of
authoritative literature and evidence to determine an appropriate accounting treatment or
reporting method. Like tax professionals, auditors also have a desire to please and retain
clients, suggesting that they may likewise be susceptible to a confirmation bias during
10

their search for evidence. Unlike tax professionals, however, auditors do not act as client
advocates. Rather, auditors are public stewards and must evaluate evidence objectively
and with professional skepticism. Professional skepticism in an audit setting requires that
the auditor not be satisfied with evidence which is less than persuasive simply by virtue
of a belief that management is honest (AICPA 1997). This ascribes to the auditor a role
much closer to that of a watchdog than to a client advocate. This watchdog role,
combined with reputation and litigation risk concerns, should mitigate the potential for a
confirmation bias. Given these competing incentives, it is important to investigate
whether auditors succumb to a confirmation bias in their search for information and
whether this bias influences their judgments (Kadous et al. 2008; Trotman 2005) and
professional skepticism (Nelson 2009).
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews
prior literature and develops the research hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses the research
design and method, as well as results from the pilot study. Chapter 4 presents the results
of the study, and Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the results,
contributions, limitations, and potential implications for practice and future research.

11

CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Introduction
Before discussing the theory and hypotheses, I provide background information
on several important concepts used in my research study. The literature review for this
dissertation begins with a background of fair value reporting and describes the elements
of fair value reporting that make it a topic of interest for academic research. This section
focuses primarily on an important characteristic of fair value reporting, “uncertainty,”
and describes how this notion of uncertainty relates to auditor judgment in the presence
of current and alternate guidance. Psychology and accounting literature are reviewed to
provide a background for the research questions. Specifically, the psychology literature
describes a potential judgment bias which may arise during the audit of fair value
measurements (i.e., confirmation bias), while the accounting literature describes various
accounting settings in which confirmation bias has been investigated. A synthesis of
these streams of literature provides the basis for the hypotheses proposed in this study.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Fair Value Reporting
There has been ongoing debate regarding whether financial reporting should
move toward fair value reporting and away from historical cost reporting. While each of
the methods has its merits and drawbacks, the past few decades have witnessed the
development and implementation of standards which allow for increased reporting of
assets and liabilities at their fair values (e.g. FAS 87 Employer’s Accounting for Pensions
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(FASB 1985), FAS 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
(FASB 1998) and FAS 143, Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations (FASB 2001)).
More recently, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Financial
Accounting Standard (FAS) 157, Fair Value Measurements, which provides overall
guidance on fair value reporting.
The need for FAS 157 arose from the various definitions of fair value as provided
in other accounting pronouncements (e.g., FAS 13, Accounting for Leases and FAS 107
Disclosure about Fair Value Instruments) as well as the limited measurement guidance
provided in these pronouncements. The purpose of FAS 157, therefore, is to enhance
consistency and comparability in fair value measurements across companies. FAS 157
applies broadly to financial and nonfinancial assets and liabilities (e.g. derivative
instruments), which are already covered by other authoritative accounting
pronouncements. FAS 157 defines fair value and establishes a framework for measuring
fair value, including a hierarchy of inputs and different valuation methods.
Fair value is defined as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to
transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the
measurement date” (FAS 157, 6). Given that this definition assumes that the asset or
liability is exchanged, the objective of a fair value measurement is to determine an exit
price. The fair value measurement also assumes that the transaction to sell the asset or
transfer the liability occurs in the principal market for the asset or liability or, in the
absence of a principal market, the most advantageous market for the asset or liability
(FAS 157, 7).
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The fair value hierarchy distinguishes between observable and unobservable
inputs. Inputs are market assumptions about fair value rather than entity (i.e.,
management) assumptions. These assumptions include judgments related to risk that are
used by market participants in pricing assets and liabilities. FAS 157 recommends that
the valuation techniques used to measure fair value should maximize the use of
observable inputs and minimize the use of unobservable inputs (FAS 157, 10). Thus, the
fair value hierarchy gives the highest priority to quoted prices (unadjusted) in active
markets for identical assets and liabilities (Level 1) and the lowest priority to
unobservable inputs (Level 3) (FAS 157, 10).
As a result, FAS 157 and the increasing use of fair value reporting is
controversial. Proponents of fair value reporting argue that (1) investors are concerned
with value, not costs, (2) historical prices become irrelevant over time, (3) fair value
reflects true economic substance, and (4) fair value represents an unbiased measurement
that is consistent from period to period and across entities (Penman 2007; Barlev and
Haddad 2003). Opponents, on the other hand, argue that fair values may be biased when
(1) the firm arbitrages market prices, (2) fair values bring price bubbles into financial
statements, (3) assets and liabilities are not matched, and (4) managers possess subjective
biases (Penman 2007). Of particular interest to my study are the arguments made relative
to bias in measurements. I do not distinguish between honest biases (i.e., natural
optimism) and dishonest biases (i.e., artificial inflation of asset values) of managers, since
the role of the auditor is to attest to the fairness of the estimates regardless of the source
of the bias. To date the academic research supports opponents’ arguments that fair value
estimates are biased (e.g., Ramanna 2008; Mazza et al. 2008). In summary, the degree of

14

subjectivity involved in fair value estimation is greater for a Level 3 input versus a Level
1 input, and the broad range of judgments involved in fair value estimation (e.g.,
identifying primary markets, input levels, valuation techniques, etc.) calls into question
the reliability of management’s estimates and the importance of increased auditor
scrutiny.
2.2.2 Auditing fair values
The prospect for managers to act opportunistically emphasizes the need for
auditors to evaluate the reasonableness of management’s estimates and assumptions. Of
equal importance is critical evaluation of the standards put forth by regulatory bodies to
guide the auditor in evaluating the reasonableness of management’s FVEs. Auditors have
the role of collecting sufficient competent audit evidence to provide reasonable assurance
that fair value measurements reported in the financial statements are in conformity with
GAAP (AICPA 2002). Paralleling U.S. standards, ISA 540 states that the objective of
auditing fair value estimates is to “obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about
whether: (a) accounting estimates, including fair value accounting estimates, in the
financial statements, whether recognized or disclosed, are reasonable; and (b) related
disclosures in the financial statements are adequate, in the context of the applicable
financial reporting framework” (IAASB 2009, 5). Fair values present challenges for
auditors because of the uncertainty involved in their estimations. Given the added risk
associated with uncertainty, it is important for the auditor to understand the potential
sources of uncertainty and management’s role in deriving the fair values.
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2.2.2.1 Estimation Uncertainty
As noted above, fair value measurements involve varying degrees of subjectivity
and some are inherently more complex than others. This complexity can arise for various
reasons, including the nature of the item being measured and the valuation method used
to determine the fair value. AU Section 328, Auditing Fair Value Measurements and
Disclosures, characterizes complex fair value measurements as those that involve greater
uncertainty regarding the reliability of the measurement process, and also lists factors
which may result in greater uncertainty. These factors include the length of the forecast
period, the number of significant and complex assumptions associated with the process, a
higher degree of subjectivity associated with the assumptions and factors used in the
process, a higher degree of uncertainty associated with the future occurrence or outcome
of events underlying the assumptions used, and lack of objective data when highly
subjective factors are used (AICPA 2002). Similarly, International Standard on Auditing
(ISA) 540 acknowledges that the degree of estimation uncertainty varies based on the
nature of the accounting estimate, the extent to which a generally accepted method is
used to make the estimate, and the subjectivity of the assumptions used in making the
estimate (IAASB 2009).
The degree of estimation uncertainty associated with an accounting estimate may
influence the estimate’s susceptibility to bias, thus affecting the risk of material
misstatement. Similar to AU Section 328, ISA 540 indicates that the degree of estimation
uncertainty may be influenced by factors including the extent to which the estimate
depends on judgment, the sensitivity of the accounting estimate to changes in
assumptions, the existence of recognized measurement techniques that may mitigate the

16

estimation uncertainty, the length of the forecast period and the relevance of the data
drawn from past events to forecast future events, the availability of data from an external
source, and the extent to which the estimate is based on observable versus unobservable
data (IAASB 2009). ISA 540 provides examples of accounting estimates involving
relatively low estimation uncertainty and presumably lower risk of material misstatement.
These include estimates that (1) arise from non-complex business transactions, (2) are
frequently made because they relate to routine transactions, (3) are derived from readily
available (i.e., observable) market data, and (4) require a simple, well-known, or
generally accepted method of measurement. Alternatively, accounting estimates
involving relatively high estimation uncertainty may be characterized by more complex
assumptions, are highly dependent upon judgment, are not calculated using recognized
measurement techniques, and use highly specialized entity-developed models for which
there are no observable inputs (IAASB 2009).
As noted above, the subjectivity of management provided estimates increases
with the extent of complexity (i.e., degree of estimation uncertainty). Similarly, the
susceptibility of a fair value estimate to management bias increases with the degree of
subjectivity involved in making it because of the unobservable (thus less verifiable)
nature of the assumptions driving the estimation process (IAASB 2009).
In general, research finds that reliability of estimates increases when they are
derived from actively traded market information (i.e., Level 1 input) versus internally
(management) generated information (i.e., Level 3 input) (Barth 1994; Petroni and
Wahlen 1995). Mazza et al. (2006 working paper) investigates the potential for earnings
management in a Level 3 input (an asset retirement obligation), and they find that when
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faced with a dilemma of choosing between self-interest and company-interest, financial
executives with a performance-based bonus plan choose an amount that serves their selfinterest. McEwen et al. (2008) find that financial analysts are aware of this potential for
earnings management in Level 3 inputs. Specifically, they find that financial analysts
expect firm managers to take advantage of the discretion allowed in determining the fair
value of nonfinancial assets and liabilities (i.e., in Level 3 inputs). Interestingly, they find
that analysts ignore management’s biases in measuring fair values when it furthers the
analysts’ own self-interest related to stock price valuation assessments about the
company. This suggests that even outside stakeholders take advantage of the innate
subjectivity involved in the Level 3 inputs.
It has also been proposed that analysts will have problems in carrying out a
quality analysis of fair value estimates because of the difficulty in discovering estimation
errors, regardless of whether they are random or biased (Penman 2007). Given the
incentive for management to bias estimates and the difficulty (or disincentives) users may
have in unraveling errors, the competence and independence of monitors (i.e., auditors)
must be evaluated (Penman 2007).
2.2.2.2 Audit guidance
AU Section 328 Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures (AICPA
2002) provides broad guidance on auditing fair value estimates and their related
disclosures in the financial statements. For example, AU Section 328 prescribes that the
auditor should obtain an understanding of the entity’s process for determining fair value
measurements (FVMs) and the relevant controls, assess the risk of material misstatement,
evaluate whether the entity’s method for determining FVMs is consistent, and whether to
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use the work of a specialist. This section, however, does not provide specific guidance for
how to audit selected assets and liabilities. Instead, AU 328 directs auditors to other
standards for more specific guidance. AU 332, for instance, provides guidance for
auditing derivative instruments, hedging activities, and investments in securities.
Specifically, this standard says that “the auditor should obtain evidence supporting
management’s assertions about the fair value of derivatives and securities measured or
disclosed at fair value” (AU Sec. 332.35, AICPA 2000). This standard provides auditors
with a directional goal versus a non-directional goal. That is, the standard directs auditors
to find evidence to support management’s goals rather than to obtain objective evidence
in order to assess the reasonableness of management’s FVM. Martin et al. (2006) suggest
that the wording of this standard can actually lead to a confirmation bias, wherein the
auditor searches for information that supports management’s estimates and either
disregards or diminishes the weight given to disconfirming information.
AU Section 328 also suggests that the auditor may make an independent estimate
of fair value to corroborate management’s fair value estimate. When doing so, the auditor
may use a self-developed model and may evaluate management’s assumptions or develop
his or her own assumptions. In either case, the auditor should understand management’s
assumptions and use that understanding to ensure that their own independent estimate
takes into account all significant variables related to the estimate. This understanding will
also assist in evaluating any significant differences from management’s estimate.
ISA 540 advises the auditor to consider developing a point estimate or a range to
evaluate management’s estimate. This approach may be most appropriate when (1) an
estimate is not derived from the routine processing of data by the accounting system, (2)
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the auditor’s review of similar estimates made in the prior period financial statements
suggests that management’s current period process is unlikely to be effective, (3) the
entity’s controls within and over management’s processes for determining estimates are
not well designed or properly implemented, (4) events or transactions between the period
end and the date of the auditor’s report contradict management’s point estimate, and (5)
there are alternative sources of relevant data available (IAASB 2009).
Alternatively, the auditor can search for information which disconfirms
management’s estimates. Currently, there are no audit standards which specifically direct
the auditor to “disconfirm” management’s assertions, however, fraud standards (e.g.,
SAS 99) are nuanced such that the auditor should not be satisfied with client-provided
evidence on the belief that management is honest. SAS 99, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 2002), requires the auditor to exercise professional
skepticism regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and integrity,
and “requires an ongoing questioning of whether the information and evidence obtained
suggests that a material misstatement due to fraud has occurred” (AU 316.13). This
wording implies that standard setters may consider a “questioning” or “disconfirming”
approach to be a reasonable approach in areas that involve greater judgment and
incentive for management bias, as is the case with fair value estimation because of the
uncertainty involved and the higher risk of material misstatement. A disconfirming
approach would serve to heighten the auditor’s professional skepticism, thereby
enhancing the likelihood that biased estimates are detected. Some may argue that a
disconfirming approach would lead to an inefficient audit in cases where management’s
estimate is unbiased; however, the objective of this dissertation is not to determine the
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appropriate balance between audit efficiency and effectiveness. Rather, the goal, as it
relates to professional skepticism, is to determine whether audit guidance can be used to
heighten auditors’ professional skepticism.
2.2.2.3 Professional Skepticism
Nelson (2009) defines professional skepticism as “indicated by auditor judgments
and decisions that reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is
incorrect, conditional on the information available to the auditor” (1). Relative to other
definitions provided in prior research and audit standards (e.g., SAS No. 1), 3 this
definition takes more of a “presumptive doubt” than a “neutral” view of professional
skepticism, suggesting that auditors who exhibit high professional skepticism need
relatively more persuasive evidence (in terms of quality and/or quantity) to be convinced
that an assertion is correct (Nelson 2009, 1). This definition is consistent with the
wording found in fraud standards, as well as other areas where management has greater
discretion (e.g., accounting estimates) (Nelson 2009). For example, SAS No. 57 states
that accounting estimates are based on subjective, as well as objective factors, and given
the potential for bias in the subjective factors auditors should consider both subjective
and objective factors with an attitude of professional skepticism. Consistent with Nelson
(2009), I adopt the “presumptive doubt” definition of professional skepticism to evaluate
the extent to which auditors exercise professional skepticism in evaluating FVEs.
Nelson (2009) provides a model that describes how audit evidence combines with
auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives to produce judgments and actions that reflect
professional skepticism. (See Figure 1.) Of primary interest to my study is whether audit
3

SAS No. 1 indicates that professional skepticism is “an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a
critical assessment of audit evidence.” AU 230.07-09 states that the auditor “neither assumes that
management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty.” (AICPA 1997)
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guidance and uncertainty affect professional skepticism through their effect on auditors’
confirmation bias during the evidential input phase. 4 (See Figure 2). Using Nelson’s
(2009) professional skepticism model as a foundation, I seek to explain how and why the
predicted effects occur.

4

Nelson (2009) defines evidential input as “any information collected and considered in the course of the
audit” (6).
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Figure 1: Professional Skepticism Model (Nelson 2009)
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Figure 2: Extended Model for Study
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2.3 Theory and Hypotheses
This dissertation draws from psychology theory and prior accounting research to
help form expectations of auditor behavior when faced with directional audit guidance in
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situations involving uncertainty. The theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990)
provides insight into individuals’ search strategies and their propensity to exhibit
confirmation bias. Framing induced biases, such as negativity bias, help to explain
differences in behaviors when individuals review positive and negative information. In
this section, these theories are reviewed and examined in accounting settings to form the
basis for the study’s hypotheses.
2.3.1 Motivated Reasoning
Kunda (1990) proposed the theory of motivated reasoning, wherein motivation
affects reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for
accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. Kunda defines motivation as “any wish,
desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task” (p. 480). The
basic premise of the theory is that when people are motivated to either be accurate or
consistent with a desired conclusion, they tend to use more cognitive effort and attend to
more relevant information that supports their goal.
Kunda’s review of motivated reasoning is divided into two categories: (1)
accuracy goals that lead to the use of beliefs and strategies that are considered most
appropriate, and (2) directional goals that lead to the use of beliefs and strategies that are
considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. 5 Kunda notes that while the two
types of goals are both indicative of motivated reasoning, they should be considered
separately as they may involve different mechanisms.
According to Kunda, the work on accuracy-driven reasoning suggests that when
people are motivated to be accurate, they will exert more effort, pay attention to relevant

5

In this study, I use the term “non-directional” goal instead of “accuracy” goal to avoid the implication that
auditors are not concerned with accuracy when engaging in directional goals.
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cues, and process information more deeply. In fact, several different kinds of biases have
been shown in psychology research to be lessened in the presence of accuracy goals.
Kunda surmises that people that are motivated to be accurate will likely seek and use
rules and beliefs for processing information that is deemed more appropriate.
In the second area, relating to directional goals, Kunda proposes that people
motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a
justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade an unbiased observer. In
order to achieve this, people maintain an “illusion of objectivity,” searching memory for
specific beliefs and rules that support their desired position. They may also use their
knowledge to construct theories that could logically support their desired conclusion.
Boiney et al. (1997) propose and demonstrate two extensions to the motivation
literature. First, they find that motivated reasoning is instrumental, meaning that
motivated individuals bias their judgments more or less as needed to support the desired
conclusion, subject to reasonable constraints. 6 In other words, despite the motivation to
reach a desired conclusion, individuals make decisions they are able to justify. Thus,
auditors may not engage in motivated reasoning to the extent that they would like
because they may be constrained by litigation concerns. Second, Boiney et al. (1997) find
that motivated individuals exhibit confidence bolstering, meaning that they will adjust
their confidence in their motivated judgments.
Kunda and Sinclair (1999) also extend the motivated reasoning research by
arguing that, in addition to the activation of helpful knowledge, individuals also inhibit
thoughts that would disconfirm their desired conclusion. In other words, motivation may

6

Reasonable constraints for auditors may include standards, regulations, and generally accepted accounting
principles.

26

activate (suppress) the knowledge structures that would support (interfere with) reaching
the desired outcome. Kunda and Sinclair suggest that it is difficult for individuals to
maintain a belief when there is information that contradicts it, thus they believe that
individuals suppress such contradictory information when accessing and weighing cues.
Thus, a confirmation bias can be introduced as early as in the information search stage.
2.3.2 Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias, a specific form of motivated reasoning, has been defined in a
variety of ways in the psychology literature. Klayman and Ha (1987) suggest that people
who are prone to a confirmation bias tend to test those cases that have the best chance of
verifying current beliefs (positive testing) rather than those that have the best chance of
falsifying them (negative testing). They suggest people use the positive test strategy as a
general default heuristic and that positive testing often serves the hypothesis tester well.
Klayman and Ha concede, however, that positive testing can lead to problems when
applied inappropriately. For example, it can produce misleading feedback by failing to
reveal falsifications or it can lead to inefficiency or inaccuracy by overweighting and
underweighting data. They conclude that the consequences of using a positive test
strategy vary with the characteristics of the task, thus making generalizations from prior
research difficult.
Jonas et al. (2001) use the term “confirmation bias” to mean something slightly
different from Klayman and Ha (1987). Jonas et al. (2001) suggest that the positive test
strategy to which Klayman and Ha refer means asking questions that are consistent with
the hypothesis being tested. Jonas et al. (2001) argue that gathering evidence to support
the hypothesis should be labeled ‘positive hypothesis testing’ rather than ‘confirmation

27

bias’ because this way of asking questions does not imply that the person will be
confirmed in his or her hypothesis. Thus, Jonas et al. (2001) define confirmation bias to
mean “requesting information that supports a pre-selected alternative, thus the decision
maker using this strategy knows that he or she will get the confirmation sought” (557).
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Kadous et al. 2008), this paper adopts the definition
provided by Jonas et al. (2001); that is, a confirmation bias will be said to exist when
auditors search for and consider information that supports a pre-selected alternative. In
this study, because of the first-mover effect, wherein management provides the auditor
with its FVE, the pre-selected alternative (by default) is the client’s reported FVE; thus a
confirmation bias will be documented when the auditor searches for and emphasizes
evidence which favors management’s FVE over evidence which disfavors management’s
FVE. I argue, however, that the pre-selected alternative can be changed by simply
reframing the audit guidance. Specifically, when the audit guidance tells the auditor to
find evidence opposing management’s fair value estimates, then the pre-selected
alternative shifts from evidence that corroborates management’s FVE to evidence that
questions management’s FVE. In this case, a confirmation bias is said to exist when the
auditor searches for and emphasizes evidence which disfavors management’s FVE over
evidence which favors management’s FVE. For expositional purposes, and consistent
with McMillan and White (1993), this confirmatory strategy that is biased in the direction
of disfavoring evidence will be referred to as a “conservative bias.” In either case
(confirmation bias vs. conservative bias), bias is defined as a deviation from a balanced
search.
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2.3.2.1 Confirmation Bias in Auditing
Prior literature demonstrates that accounting professionals exhibit confirmation
bias when reviewing client-provided information. The tax literature, for example, finds
strong evidence that tax professionals engage in motivated reasoning and exhibit
confirmation bias when the client’s preferred position is known. These results may differ
for auditors because, unlike the client advocacy role assumed by tax professionals,
auditors are called to be objective and exercise professional skepticism throughout the
audit (AICPA 1997). Like tax professionals, however, auditors often face incentives (e.g.,
competitive market pressures) to acquiesce to client preferred positions, and may engage
in motivated reasoning at the expense of professional skepticism. For example, Salterio
and Koonce (1997) find that when client preference is known and the available evidence
regarding appropriate treatment is mixed, auditors tend to follow the client’s position.
Other studies, however, show that auditors are sensitive to disconfirming evidence (e.g.,
Ashton and Ashton 1988, 1990; Tubbs et al. 1990), and that this could be due to
professional skepticism or natural constraints at work in the profession (Ashton and
Ashton 1990; Asare and Wright 2003).
A substantial body of research in auditing examines whether auditors exhibit
confirmation bias when gathering information that serves as evidence to support or refute
initially-generated hypotheses. While many audit tasks, such as fair value evaluation, do
not require initial generation of hypotheses, they require processing that is akin to
hypothesis evaluation (Bonner 2008). For example, auditors assessing the reasonableness
of a fair value estimate may not make a priori judgments about the fairness of the
estimate before collecting evidence. According to Bonner (2008), their evaluation of
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evidence, however, is similar to the process of evaluating an explicit hypothesis, and the
choice available for assessments of fair value such as “reasonable” or “not reasonable”
may be considered implicit hypotheses. Studies examining whether auditors exhibit
confirmation bias when evaluating an initially-generated hypothesis find that
confirmation bias is influenced by the source of the hypothesis. Specifically, when
auditors develop their own hypothesis, they are more likely to search for confirming
evidence which supports that hypothesis (Kaplan and Reckers 1989; Church 1990;
Heiman-Hoffman et al. 1995; Bonner 2008). Further, McMillan and White (1993)
investigate whether auditors’ evidence search is influenced by the frame of the initial
hypothesis being tested. They find that when auditors favor an error frame (i.e.,
intentional or unintentional misstatements of financial statements), they react more
strongly to both confirming and disconfirming evidence than those who favor a non-error
frame (i.e., environmental or industry changes). They also find greater professional
skepticism for auditors who favor the error frame, and conclude that confirmation bias
may partially account for this effect by enhancing the emphasis on error.
Decision strategies may differ, however, when auditors inherit a hypothesis from
an external source. In auditing, it is often the case that auditors inherit hypotheses from
their clients because of the “first mover/second mover” effect discussed previously.
Earley et al. (2008) suggest that auditors’ judgments are influenced by information
provided by the client, which may impede an auditor’s ability to make objective
judgments. This information may be provided in the form of a client explanation or
simply client-reported values. For example, Kinney and Uecker (1982) and McDaniel
and Kinney (1995) find that auditors are influenced by client-provided book values to an
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extent that the values bias the auditors’ expectations of the audited values, often leading
to the incorrect acceptance of misstated accounts. My study extends these findings by
examining whether directional audit guidance affects this previously documented
confirmation bias.
The extent to which auditors’ judgments are influenced by external sources (such
as audit standards) depends both upon the credibility of the source and the extent to
which the auditor is held accountable to the source (Bonner 2008). Given that auditors
are held accountable to professional regulators, Kadous et al. (2003) investigate the
extent to which audit regulation can help to reduce auditor biases. Their study finds that
regulation requiring auditors to perform a quality assessment actually amplifies the
effects of motivated reasoning on acceptance of clients’ aggressive reporting methods.
Thus, it is conceivable that audit regulation contributes to auditors’ confirmatory
tendencies when the guidance increases the salience of a desired conclusion. My study
analyzes the effects of both directional and non-directional audit guidance on auditors’
search strategies to determine whether directional audit guidance results in a greater
extent of confirmation (conservative) bias exhibited by auditors in the evaluation of
FVEs.
Koehler (1991) argues that decision makers who are asked to explain or imagine
that a hypothesis is true will temporarily accept the hypothesis as true, consequently
affecting their information search and interpretation of relevant data. In other words,
Koehler suggests that a task requiring that a hypothesis be treated as if it were true is
sufficient to increase confidence in the truth of that hypothesis, at the expense of viable
alternatives. Thus, I propose that directional audit guidance can affect auditor
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confirmation bias by providing the auditor with an implicit hypothesis that implies either
veracity (e.g., confirm) or doubt (e.g., disconfirm).
Non-directional audit guidance (e.g., generate own estimate) may serve to curb
confirmation bias by emphasizing accuracy over efficiency. For example, Brown et al.
(1999) find that auditors exhibit less confirmation bias when interpreting audit evidence
when they are told to emphasize truth discovery over efficiency. Truth discovery is aimed
at discovering the true cause of observed phenomena, while efficiency is aimed at
lowering costs. Brown et al. (1999) employed a rule discovery game to test their
hypotheses. The goal of the game was to identify the rule that generated a set of three
integers between 1 and 100. They find that auditors become more confirmation prone
with efficiency-oriented incentives than with truth-oriented incentives. They also find
that when incentives reward effectiveness, auditors are disconfirmation prone. Following
Kunda (1990), I expect a non-directional goal (e.g., generate own) to elicit truth/accuracy
discovery strategies, and directional goals (e.g., confirm/disconfirm) to lead to biased
search strategies, biased in the direction of the goal. In addition, the magnitude of bias
may be influenced by the extent to which the auditor searches for negative (disfavoring)
evidence relative to positive (favoring) evidence. For example, Levin et al. (1998) review
different types of framing effects and make note of negativity bias, wherein people pay
greater attention to and are influenced more by negative information relative to positive
information.
2.3.3 Negativity bias
Rozin and Royzman (2001) indicate that, “…in most situations, negative events
are more salient, potent, dominant in combination, and generally efficacious than positive
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events” (297). Rozin and Royzman suggest that there is no single theory to explain this
negativity bias and instead propose four contributors to negativity bias: negative potency,
greater steepness of negative gradients, negativity dominance, and negative
differentiation. Each of these is briefly defined below.
The first contributor, negative potency refers to the greater strength and higher
salience of negative information versus positive information, given positive and negative
information of equal objective magnitude. The second contributor is greater steepness of
negative gradients, wherein negative events “grow more rapidly in negativity as they are
approached in space or time than do positive events” (Rozin and Royzman 2001, 298).
Rozin and Royzman note, however, that this greater steepness of negative gradients could
simply be a manifestation of negative potency as additional negative units will produce
larger psychological effects than additional positive units.
The third contributor of negativity bias is negativity dominance in which, “the
holistic perception and appraisal of integrated negative and positive events (or objects,
individuals, hedonic episodes, personality traits, etc.) is more negative than the algebraic
sum of the subjective values of those individual entities” (Rozin and Royzman 2001,
299). Rozin and Royzman suggest that negativity dominance occurs after the possibility
of negative potency and is therefore independent of it.
Finally, the fourth contributor to negativity bias is referred to as greater negative
differentiation. Rozin and Royzman state that “negativity bias manifests itself in the fact
that negative stimuli are generally construed as more elaborate and differentiated than the
corresponding positive stimuli” (299). For example, Rozin and Royzman note that the
vocabulary to describe negative events is far richer and more varied than the vocabulary
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used to describe positive events, and that there are a greater number of negative emotions
than positive emotions.
My study does not attempt to differentiate between the four types of negativity
bias as each points to the same implication, namely that auditors will demonstrate a
stronger reaction to negative (i.e., disfavoring) evidence than positive (i.e., favoring)
evidence. In summary, I propose that audit guidance for evaluating FVEs provides an
implicit hypothesis to the auditor and that the hypothesis frame (i.e., support or
disconfirm) affects the auditor’s propensity to exhibit confirmation bias or conservative
bias depending upon the direction of the guidance. Specifically, I predict that when audit
guidance directs the auditor to support management’s FVE, the guidance provides an
implicit hypothesis that the estimate is accurate and, consistent with motivated reasoning,
auditors will exhibit a confirmation bias, wherein they favor supporting evidence over
disconfirming evidence. Alternatively, when audit guidance directs the auditor to
disconfirm management’s FVE, the guidance provides an implicit hypothesis that the
estimate may be doubtful and auditors will exhibit a conservative bias, wherein they
favor disconfirming evidence over confirming evidence. Further, due to the influence of
negativity bias, I expect that the magnitude of bias in the disconfirm condition will be
greater than the magnitude of bias in the confirm condition. In the absence of directional
guidance (e.g., the auditor is directed to generate his or her own estimate), the auditor
does not inherit an implicit hypothesis and it is not clear whether the auditor will adopt a
confirmatory approach biased towards supporting evidence or a conservative approach
biased towards disconfirming evidence. In either case, I expect any confirmation bias or
conservative bias exhibited under non-directional guidance to be less pronounced than
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bias exhibited when auditors are provided with directional audit guidance. I also expect
that the extent of confirmation bias or conservative bias will depend upon the degree of
uncertainty inherent in the FVE as discussed in the next section.
2.3.4 Estimation Uncertainty
Fair value estimation is an ambiguous task given that fair value estimation
requires a great number of cues to be taken into account and these cues can be complex,
contradictory, and uncertain (Budner 1962, 30). Norton (1975) provides eight conditions
that would classify information as ambiguous, and one of those conditions is uncertainty
(608). Thus, as the degree of uncertainty (i.e., lack of precision in measurement)
increases, the fair value estimation becomes more ambiguous, and the evaluation
becomes more complex for auditors. Prior literature has suggested that intolerance for
ambiguity affects auditors’ judgments and decisions (e.g., Faircloth and Ricchiute 1981;
Nelson and Kinney 1997). Budner (1962) defines intolerance for ambiguity as “the
tendency to perceive (i.e., interpret) ambiguous situations as a source of threat” (29).
Dermer (1973) suggests that individuals deal with this threat by searching for more
information in an effort to become more confident in decisions. Thus, it is reasonable to
expect that auditors will exhibit a greater magnitude of confirmation bias under
conditions of high uncertainty relative to low uncertainty as auditors will seek more
information that supports their desired conclusion. It is also possible that auditors will
deal with ambiguity by escaping into whatever seems concrete (Frenkel-Brunswik 1948,
115, c.f., Norton 1975), or qualitative (Dermer 1973). In my study, the audit guidance is
concrete and qualitative; thus, auditors may rely only on audit guidance to drive their
search, regardless of the uncertainty surrounding the FVE. It is possible, therefore, that
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uncertainty will have no effect on the extent of auditors’ confirmation bias. Bonner
(2008) also suggests that as task complexity increases, auditors may experience cognitive
overload and may switch from compensatory to noncompensatory processing. In
compensatory processing, cues can compensate for each other (Bonner 2008). In other
words, individuals make trade-offs between conflicting information. In noncompensatory
processing, individuals do not allow cues to compensate for each other, thereby avoiding
conflict (Bonner 2008). Thus, it is possible that auditors, in an effort to avoid conflict,
will not seek additional information when faced with a FVE involving high uncertainty
and will resort to the same degree of confirmation bias exhibited by auditors evaluating a
FVE involving low uncertainty.
Of interest to this study is whether high uncertainty leads to greater bias. Further,
I investigate whether there is an interactive effect between audit guidance and uncertainty
such that the magnitude of conservative bias exhibited by auditors instructed to oppose
management’s FVE is greater than the magnitude of confirmation bias exhibited by
auditors instructed to support management’s FVE when the FVE involves high
uncertainty. In the next section, prior literature related to uncertainty in the audit setting is
reviewed to provide further insight into auditors’ judgments and decisions in situations of
uncertainty.
2.3.4.1 Uncertainty in Auditing
Auditors are often faced with countervailing incentives that can affect the extent
of confirmation bias and professional skepticism exercised in situations involving
uncertainty. For example, auditors may be influenced by the long-term goal of attracting
and retaining clients, leading to auditor support of management’s aggressive reporting
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choices (Kadous et al. 2008). Alternatively, auditors may react conservatively to
uncertainty to avoid legal and reputational losses.
Prior research has demonstrated that accounting professionals use ambiguity
(including the uncertainty in both financial reporting guidance and in reporting outcomes)
to support desired goals and conclusions. For example, archival analysis of auditor
judgments finds that auditors are less likely to require adjustments when the reporting in
question involves subjective accounting rules and judgments (Nelson et al. 2002, 2003).
Nelson (2002) finds that auditors are less likely to question earnings management under
vague standards compared to more precise standards. Behavioral studies find similar
results (e.g., Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Mayhew et al. 2001; Kadous et al. 2003).
Mayhew et al. (2001), for example, find that uncertainty about the appropriate accounting
treatment influences auditor objectivity such that auditors misreport in favor of their
client. Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) also find that, given sufficient ambiguity, auditors
justify aggressive reporting through their own aggressive interpretations of accounting
standards. 7 Nelson (2003) adds that, even with precise standards, incentive-consistent
reporting choices are often justified through aggressive interpretation of evidence.
Wright and Wright (1997) examine various factors affecting the decision to waive
audit adjustments and find that auditors are more likely to waive subjective adjustments
(e.g., accounting estimates) than objective adjustments. They suggest that the decision to
waive a subjective adjustment can be more easily justified, such as in the event of
litigation.

7

In their experiment, the appropriate reporting method involved uncertainty in that it depended on whether
the amount could be “reasonably estimated.”
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Alternatively, uncertainty in accounting practices or accounting outcomes may
lead auditors to make more conservative decisions to avoid legal and reputational losses.
Nelson and Kinney (1997) find that auditors exhibit a conservative bias towards
uncertainty about the probability that a future loss will occur (i.e., loss contingency
reporting judgments). Interestingly, despite the finding that auditors are more
conservative when evaluating probability of future loss, Nelson and Kinney find that
auditors are less conservative than financial statement users. The authors conjecture that
the finding may be related to auditor concern about jeopardizing client relations by
unnecessarily reporting on contingent losses. Despite this evidence of a conservative
reaction to ambiguity, prior research supports the notion that auditors will use latitude in
standards and estimates to justify their desired goals.
Overall, the studies reviewed are consistent with motivated reasoning in that
auditors use latitude in standards and estimates to justify their desired goals. In this study,
the desired goal is determined by the audit guidance. While prior research shows that
other factors, such as client retention, accountability, and litigation risk, influence
confirmation bias in auditors, I hold these factors constant so that any differences
detected between conditions can be attributed to the variables of interest (i.e., audit
guidance and uncertainty).
2.4 Hypotheses
The main purposes of this paper are to examine whether directional audit
standards and uncertainty affect confirmation bias in auditors and the extent to which this
bias increases or decreases professional skepticism when evaluating fair value estimates.
The next sections present the study’s formal hypotheses.

38

2.4.1 Auditor Bias and Uncertainty Hypotheses
Motivated reasoning theory proposes that when individuals have directional goals,
they engage in biased reasoning to achieve those goals (Kunda 1990). Consistent with
this theory, audit research reports that auditors exhibit bias when they have preferred
goals and that they exploit uncertainty in the decision context to achieve those goals.
Further, ambiguity intolerance theory suggests that individuals who are intolerant of
uncertainty can deal with the threat of uncertainty by searching for more information and
this extended search can increase bias. Collectively, these theories and prior audit
literature suggest that directional audit guidance and estimation uncertainty individually
and jointly affect auditor bias in the evaluation of fair value estimates. While audit
literature also identifies factors that can work to mitigate auditor bias (e.g., conservatism,
litigation concerns), it is not known how these factors will influence auditor behaviors in
a fair value setting. Thus, my predictions are grounded in psychology theories.
Specifically, I propose that when auditors are given directional guidance they will exhibit
bias when auditing client-reported values and that this bias will be magnified when
uncertainty surrounding management fair value estimates is increased. (See Figure 3 for a
graphical depiction of the predicted interaction effect.) Formally stated:
H1a: When uncertainty associated with a fair value estimate goes from a low
level to a high level the provision of directional guidance relative to nondirectional guidance will increase the bias in the auditor evaluation of
management’s estimate.
Evidence from psychology literature also demonstrates that negative information
influences individuals’ evaluations more strongly than positive information. Thus, I
predict that when auditors are specifically directed to disconfirm, they will exhibit greater
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bias due to the influence of negativity bias and that this bias 8 will become greatest when
estimation uncertainty is high. Formally stated:
H1b: The combination of disconfirm directional audit guidance and high
uncertainty in management’s fair value estimate will result in the greatest
bias in auditor evaluation of fair value estimates.

Confirmation Bias

Figure 3: Interaction Effect Predicted in Hypothesis 1a

Conservative Bias

low uncertainty
support

generate own

oppose

high uncertainty

Audit Guidance

Given the potential implications of directional audit guidance and uncertainty for
practice and standard-setting, it is important to examine the individual main effects of
each on confirmation bias. For example, it could be informative to standard-setters to
understand the effects of directional audit guidance on confirmation bias, irrespective of
the level of uncertainty, as they consider issuing audit guidance in other areas such as the
evaluation of Management’s Discussion and Analysis. It could also be informative to

8

Recall that bias represents a deviation from a balanced search. In the discussion of the results, an auditor
who seeks more confirming evidence than disconfirming evidence will be said to exhibit a confirmation
bias, while an auditor who seeks more disconfirming evidence than confirming evidence will be said to
exhibit a conservative bias.
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firms who issue additional guidance to auditors via practice guides and other materials
such as decision aids. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis in an effort to assess
the effect of audit guidance on bias.
H1c: Auditors presented with directional audit guidance will exhibit a
greater magnitude of bias during the evidential input phase relative to
auditors presented with non-directional audit guidance.
The simple main effects of uncertainty can also be of interest to practitioners as
uncertainty will most certainly have implications for audit efficiency and effectiveness,
irrespective of the audit guidance issued. Auditors’ inexperience with, and intolerance
for, uncertainty could lead to biased evaluations of fair value estimates. As noted
previously it is expected that auditors examining fair value estimates under high
uncertainty will seek more information to deal with the threat of uncertainty, and the
nature of the information (i.e., positive versus negative) will affect the extent of
confirmation bias. Thus, I hypothesize that high uncertainty in fair value estimates will
lead auditors to exhibit a greater magnitude of bias than low uncertainty. Formally stated:
H1d: Auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving high estimation
uncertainty will exhibit a greater magnitude of bias during the evidential
input phase relative to auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving low
estimation uncertainty.
2.4.2 Professional Skepticism Hypotheses
To evaluate the effect of confirmatory strategies in evidential input on
professional skepticism, I examine whether auditors who exhibit confirmation
(conservative) bias during the evidential input phase also exhibit less (more) professional
skepticism in their subsequent judgments and decisions. Consistent with Nelson’s (2009)
professional skepticism model, I separate professional skepticism into two components:
skeptical judgment and skeptical action. Judgment is a critical part of the audit and is
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required in the evaluation of audit evidence (AICPA 1997). In general, one would expect
judgments to influence decisions. However, it is possible that skeptical judgments formed
during evidence evaluation do not translate into skeptical actions. Nelson (2009) argues
that auditors must exceed a certain threshold of skeptical judgment to create skeptical
action. In addition, Nelson proposes that the extent to which skeptical judgment affects
skeptical action may depend on auditors’ incentives and traits. Thus, it is important to
examine whether skeptical judgments formed in the evaluation of fair value estimates
lead to skeptical actions.
Nelson’s model shows that evidence evaluation is an important input of skeptical
judgment and that skeptical judgment is a primary driver of skeptical action. Consistent
with Nelson’s model, I expect that when an auditor exhibits bias in evidence evaluation,
this bias will affect the auditor’s skeptical judgment, and this judgment will subsequently
affect the auditor’s skeptical action. Specifically, I predict that when auditors exhibit
confirmation (conservative) bias during the evidential input phase, this bias affects their
subsequent skeptical judgment. This hypothesis is nondirectional since confirmation bias
and conservative bias go in opposite directions. Further, I predict that as skeptical
judgment increases so will skeptical action. Formally stated:
H2: Auditors’ bias significantly affects auditors’ skeptical judgment.
H3: Increasing skeptical judgment will result in increasing skeptical action.
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
3.1 Introduction
I employ an experiment to investigate whether audit guidance and estimation
uncertainty independently and jointly affect auditors’ confirmation bias and professional
skepticism in the evaluation of FVEs. The experimental design allows for the
investigation of auditors’ search processes, as well as resulting judgments and decisions.
An important aspect of this study is that it uses a custom web-based instrument, which
allows me to track auditors’ search patterns and time spent viewing evidence. This aspect
will provide insight into how auditors make decisions and whether processes employed
and effort exercised during the evidential input phase affect auditors’ resulting judgments
and decisions.
3.2 Research Design
To address the research questions, I use a 3 x 2 between-participants experimental
design in which professional auditors and undergraduate auditing students were recruited
to participate. The first independent variable is audit guidance and the second
independent variable is uncertainty. The experimental design and manipulations are
depicted in Table 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions
shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: 3 x 2 Factorial Research Design
Factor 1: Audit Guidance
Support
Generate
Disconfirm
Estimate
Own
Estimate
Estimate
Low
Factor 2: Estimation
Uncertainty

High

Factor 1: Audit guidance
Level 1: Support Management’s Estimate – auditors are provided with audit
guidance telling them to support management’s fair value estimate.
Level 2: Generate Own Estimate – auditors are provided with audit guidance
telling them to generate their own fair value estimate.
Level 3: Disconfirm Management’s Estimate – auditors are provided with audit
guidance telling them to oppose management’s fair value estimate.
Factor 2: Estimation uncertainty
Level 1: Low Estimation Uncertainty – the fair value estimate provided by
management has little sensitivity to changes in assumptions made in deriving the
estimate.
Level 2: High Estimation Uncertainty – the fair value estimate provided by
management is highly sensitive to changes in assumptions made in deriving the
estimate.

3.3 Treatments/Independent Variables
3.3.1 Audit Guidance
The first independent variable is “Audit Guidance” and it is manipulated at three
levels: (1) support management’s estimate, (2) disconfirm management’s estimate, and
(3) generate own estimate. Wording for the support management’s estimate manipulation
is as follows:
Support management’s estimate:
When reviewing management’s key assumptions, and evidence related to these
assumptions, assume that the following audit standards and firm policies are in
place.
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Auditing standards and your firm’s policies require, among other things, that the
auditor:
obtain evidence supporting management’s assertions about the fair
value of the reacquired franchise rights,
and that the auditor shall:
evaluate available evidential matter so as to corroborate the fair value
amount of the reacquired franchise rights.

The wording for the support condition is taken directly from AU Sec. 332.35
(AICPA 2000). The rationale for confirmatory guidance relates to audit efficiency. That
is, if management’s estimates are reasonable, then confirming these estimates rather than
investigating possible alternatives leads to a more efficient audit. Bonner (2008) notes
that confirmation bias may be an adaptive mechanism that works well in many cases.
Hence, it may be the case that confirmation bias would work well if management’s
estimates were unbiased; however, the motivation for this study is predicated on research
that shows that management’s estimates may be biased. 9
Wording for the disconfirm management’s estimate manipulation is as follows:
Disconfirm management’s estimate:
When reviewing management’s key assumptions, and evidence related to these
assumptions, assume that the following audit standards and firm policies are in
place.
Auditing standards and your firm’s policies require, among other things, that the
auditor:
obtain evidence opposing management’s assertions about the fair
value of the reacquired franchise rights,

9

This research does not discriminate between honest bias (i.e., natural optimism) and dishonest bias (i.e.,
opportunistic reporting).
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and that the auditor shall:
evaluate available evidential matter so as to question the fair value
amount of the reacquired franchise rights.
The wording of this condition is intended to represent the opposite frame of the
wording presented in AU Sec. 332.35 (AICPA 2000). The word “opposing” is used
instead of “disconfirm” because feedback from academics revealed that the word
“disconfirm” carried too strong of an implication that the auditor should not be satisfied
with management’s fair value estimate unless it could be proven to be incorrect. The
intention of the disconfirm condition is to induce the auditor to view information which
disfavors management’s estimate, however, the intention is not to rule out the possibility
that management’s estimate is reasonable. In other words, the intention is to reduce
auditor overreliance on (or overconfidence in) client representations. The term
“opposing” presumes doubt in the representational faithfulness of the estimate and should
lead the auditor to question management’s estimate. One could argue that this approach
may lead to an inefficient audit in cases where management’s estimate is not biased;
however, the research objective of this project is not to find the optimal level of
efficiency in auditing FVEs. Rather, the objective is to determine whether the framing of
the guidance will increase or decrease confirmation bias in auditors when evaluating fair
value estimates.
Finally, the wording for the generate own estimate manipulation is as follows:
Generate own estimate:
When reviewing management’s key assumptions, and evidence related to these
assumptions, assume that the following audit standards and firm policies are in
place.
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Auditing standards and your firm’s policies require, among other things, that the
auditor:
obtain evidence to develop an independent estimate using
management’s assumptions about the fair value of the reacquired
franchise rights,
and that the auditor shall:
evaluate available evidential matter so as to separately derive the fair
value amount of the reacquired franchise rights.
The wording for this condition is derived from AU 342 Auditing Accounting
Estimates (AICPA 1988) and ISA 540, Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair
Value Estimates, and Related Disclosures (IAASB 2009), which both encourage (but do
not require) the auditor to develop an independent expectation of the estimate to
corroborate the reasonableness of management’s estimate. According to Martin et al.
(2006), “auditors are likely to benefit from producing independent estimates …rather
than merely assessing the reasonableness of management’s estimates” (298). This is
likely because simply requiring auditors to either confirm or contradict management’s
FVEs may lead the auditor to disregard evidence that provides additional information
about the estimate, simply because it neither confirms nor contradicts management’s
FVEs. In other words, providing specific instructions for confirming or disconfirming
management’s FVEs can encourage a myopic view of relevant information. Motivated
reasoning theory (Kunda 1990) supports the notion that developing an independent
estimate (i.e., a non-directional goal) encourages a more balanced search for information
(thus, less bias), relative to a directional goal requiring the auditor to either support or
oppose management’s FVE.
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3.3.2 Estimation Uncertainty
The second independent variable is “estimation uncertainty,” manipulated at two
levels: low and high, whereby estimation uncertainty is defined as the susceptibility of an
accounting estimate and related disclosures to an inherent lack of precision in its
measurement (IAASB 2009, 5). As indicated in Section 2.2.2.1, degree of estimation
uncertainty may be influenced by factors including the extent to which the estimate
depends on judgment, the sensitivity of the accounting estimate to changes in
assumptions, the existence of recognized measurement techniques that may mitigate the
estimation uncertainty, the length of the forecast period and the relevance of the data
drawn from past events to forecast future events, the availability of data from an external
source, and the extent to which the estimate is based on observable versus unobservable
data (IAASB 2009). In my study, I manipulate uncertainty by varying both the extent to
which the estimate depends on judgment, as well as the sensitivity of the accounting
estimate to changes in assumptions. I chose to manipulate uncertainty using two aspects
of uncertainty to increase the salience of the manipulation. With respect to the first aspect
(the extent to which the estimate depends on judgment), I simply tell the participant that
“…management’s estimate involves low (high) uncertainty as the estimate has little
(high) sensitivity to changes in management’s assumptions.” I also italicized and changed
the font color of the key words to blue in order to direct the participants’ attention to the
features of low and high uncertainty. With regard to the second aspect (sensitivity of
estimate to changes in management’s assumptions), I tell participants that a member of
the audit team prepared a sensitivity analysis which further develops management’s
consideration of alternative assumptions or outcomes, and develops a range for
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evaluating management’s point estimate. The range provided for the low uncertainty
condition was adapted from the Kohlbeck et al. (2009) task and was set as $18,229,000 to
$23,353,500, indicating a spread of $5,124,500. This spread was doubled in the high
uncertainty condition, leading to a range of $15,666,750 to $25,915,750. These ranges
were pilot-tested using 41 Audit I students to ensure that the manipulation of the range
for low versus high uncertainty was effective. Students were presented with a book value,
a fair value, and the range developed in the sensitivity analysis, and were asked to rate the
extent of uncertainty associated with the range using a scale of zero to nine, where zero =
no uncertainty and nine = maximum uncertainty. The mean rating of uncertainty in the
low condition was 2.71 (21 participants), and the mean rating of uncertainty in the high
condition was 5.05 (20 participants). A t-test revealed that this difference was statistically
significant (F = 19.953, p=.000), thus the manipulation of the range was deemed to be
effective. The specific wording for both aspects of the low and high uncertainty
manipulations are as follows:
Low uncertainty:
Your task is to evaluate management’s fair value estimate by reviewing
management’s assumptions and evidence available to management when
determining the fair value estimate.
A sensitivity analysis prepared by a member of the audit team shows that
management’s estimate involves low uncertainty as the estimate has little
sensitivity to changes in management’s assumptions. The sensitivity analysis
further develops management’s consideration of alternative assumptions or
outcomes, and develops a range to evaluate management’s point estimate.
The range developed in sensitivity analysis is $18,229,000 to $23,353,500.
This range can be accessed throughout your review of management’s assumptions
and evidence by returning to the tab marked “Review Audit Task.”
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High uncertainty:
Your task is to evaluate management’s fair value estimate by reviewing
management’s assumptions and evidence available to management when
determining the fair value estimate.
A sensitivity analysis prepared by a member of the audit team shows that
management’s estimate involves high uncertainty as the estimate has high
sensitivity to changes in management’s assumptions. The sensitivity analysis
further develops management’s consideration of alternative assumptions or
outcomes, and develops a range to evaluate management’s point estimate.
The range developed in sensitivity analysis is $15,666,750 to $25,915,750.
This range can be accessed throughout your review of management’s assumptions
and evidence by returning to the tab marked “Review Audit Task.”
3.4 Dependent Variables
3.4.1 Dependent Variables for Confirmation Bias
Three dependent variables are used to measure confirmation bias and to test
hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d, which predict the interaction and main effects of Audit
Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty.
The first dependent variable (TIMESTD) is based on the amount of time spent
viewing evidence during the evidential input phase. Following Kadous et al. (2008) this
variable represents the amount of time spent viewing confirming evidence minus the
amount of time spent viewing disconfirming evidence, divided by the total time spent
viewing all evidence. A positive number suggests a relative emphasis on confirming
evidence (i.e., confirmation bias); whereas, a negative number suggests a relative
emphasis on disconfirming evidence (i.e., conservative bias).
A second dependent variable (VIEWSTD) is computed by taking the number of
views of confirming evidence less the number of views of disconfirming evidence,
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divided by the total number of views. A positive number indicates a confirmation bias
and a negative number indicates a conservative bias.
A third dependent variable (SAVED) is computed by using the types of evidence
saved to the work paper file. This is a count variable where number of confirming pieces
of evidence and number of disconfirming pieces are counted and compared between
groups.
3.4.2 Dependent Variables for Professional Skepticism
Two dependent variables are used to measure professional skepticism: skeptical
judgment and skeptical action.
Skeptical judgment is measured as the risk that management’s fair value estimate
is materially misstated, where 1 is minimum risk and 9 is maximum risk. This dependent
variable is used to test hypothesis 2, which predicts that auditor bias affects skeptical
judgment.
Skeptical action is measured using the auditor’s recommended dollar amount
adjustment to the client’s reported book value of the intangible asset. A downward
adjustment will be representative of skeptical action. This dependent variable is used to
test hypothesis 3, which predicts that greater skeptical judgment leads to greater skeptical
action.
3.5 Covariates
Various questions were included in the instrument to control for factors that may
influence confirmation bias, such as knowledge and experience. I also included factors
identified in Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model as determinants of skeptical
judgment and skeptical action. Specifically, I collected information regarding
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participants’ general propensity to be skeptical using the Hurtt (2007) scale, and
information regarding their ambiguity intolerance using Budner’s (1962) scale. I also
asked participants to self-report their knowledge of fair value and auditing work
experience (related to both general audit work and auditing fair values).
3.5.1 Knowledge of Fair Value
Auditors may have difficulty assessing the reasonableness of management’s
estimates if they lack the knowledge to do so. The absence of requisite knowledge for
assessing the reasonableness of fair value estimates may contribute to a confirmation bias
as the auditor would simply rely on management’s estimate rather than conducting an
appropriate evaluation of the evidence. Bedard and Mock (1992) compare search
strategies of computer audit specialists and non-specialists in a control evaluation task.
They find that specialists searched faster, for less information, and in a more directed
manner. Participants were asked to report on a nine-point scale how knowledgeable they
are of fair value accounting, where 1 = not at all knowledgeable, and 9 = extremely
knowledgeable.
3.5.2 Experience
Jones and Sugden (2001) suggest that confirmation bias may be robust to
experience. Auditing studies examining the role of experience in confirmation bias find
mixed results. Church (1990) suggests that inexperienced auditors are more likely to
exhibit confirmation bias than experienced auditors. Kaplan and Reckers (1989) find that
experienced auditors do not succumb to a confirmation bias while performing an
analytical review task, while inexperienced auditors do. However, Bamber et al. (1997)
report that both experienced and inexperienced auditors show evidence of confirmation
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bias in fraud likelihood tasks. Participants were asked to self report the number of times
that they have reviewed fair value estimates in practice, as well as how long they have
been employed as an auditor. Participants were also asked to report their rank at the audit
firm (e.g., staff, senior, manager, partner, or other).
Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model also shows that experience and
knowledge may positively or negatively affect the level of professional skepticism
exercised by auditors. Shaub and Lawrence (2002), for example, show that less
experienced auditors are more aggressive skeptics than experienced auditors. Nelson
(2009) suggests that auditor knowledge of errors and error patterns can serve to enhance
professional skepticism; however, if auditors learn to assume non-error explanations over
time, then greater frequency knowledge can actually undermine professional skepticism.
Thus, knowledge and experience are controlled when examining both confirmation bias
and professional skepticism.
3.5.3 Auditor Traits
Nelson’s (2009) model also shows that auditor traits can affect the amount of
professional skepticism in audit decisions and judgments. Two traits of interest to this
study are professional skepticism and ambiguity intolerance. While professional
skepticism is identified as a dependent variable in this study, it is important to note that
the dependent variables for professional skepticism (e.g., skeptical judgment and
skeptical action) are measuring cognitive responses to the manipulated variables. The
covariate measure of professional skepticism will assess auditors’ innate professional
skepticism (i.e., professional skepticism trait). Hurtt (2007) provides a 30-item scale to
measure professional skepticism. This scale is based on six characteristics of skeptics that
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are distinct from knowledge and ethics: (1) suspension of judgment, (2) questioning
mind, (3) search for knowledge, (4) interpersonal understanding, (5) self-confidence, and
(6) self-determination. A copy of the scale, along with instructions, is presented in
Appendix A.
Intolerance of ambiguity has been identified as a personality trait which deserves
more attention in the accounting literature (Faircloth and Ricchiute 1981; Gul 1986). Gul
(1986) suggests that there is a relationship between individuals’ intolerance of ambiguity
and confidence in their decisions. Dermer (1973) argues that people who are intolerant of
ambiguity are less confident in their judgments and decisions than people who are
tolerant of ambiguity. Dermer further suggests that persons who are ambiguity intolerant
will seek to reduce the threat of ambiguity by searching for more information. Thus,
auditors’ intolerance for ambiguity trait is measured and controlled using Budner’s
(1962) scale. This scale is a validated scale which has been used in prior accounting
research (e.g., Dermer 1973). A reliability analysis performed by Furnham (1994) shows
that the scale has a reliability score of 0.59. While Furnham reports that other scales have
higher reliability scores, Budner’s scale was selected because of brevity and general
acceptance. Budner’s scale is “one of the best known, and well used scales in this area…”
(Furnham 1994, 404). A copy of Budner’s scale, along with scoring guidelines, is
presented in Appendix B.
3.5.4 Confidence
As discussed previously, Koehler (1991) suggests that when people need to
explain a hypothesis, they temporarily assume that the hypothesis is true. Additionally,
Koehler asserts that any task requiring that a hypothesis be treated as if it were true is
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sufficient to increase confidence in that very hypothesis. Koehler explains that the
increased confidence comes at the expense of other plausible alternatives because of
changes in problem representation, evidence evaluation, and information search that take
place when the hypothesis is temporarily treated as if it were true. Boiney et al. (1997)
also suggest that it is possible that motivated individuals make themselves confident
through an internal rationalization process employed in order to reach the desired
conclusion despite the weak evidence to support it. Thus when the standard wording
suggests that the auditor should confirm that management’s estimate is true, it will
change the problem representation to one where the auditor experiences an increase in
confidence in that estimate and the auditor may fail to conduct a balanced review of the
evidence. Participants were asked to report on a nine-point scale how confident they feel
about their assessment of management’s fair value estimate, where 1 = not at all
confident and 9 = extremely confident.
3.5.5 Risk Perceptions
Bamber et al. (1997) propose that auditors’ sensitivity to risk may affect their
attitude to evidence. They find that auditors’ attitudes toward evidence are sensitive to
audit risk, specifically, the risk of material misstatement. I use two questions to capture
auditors’ risk perceptions. First, participants are asked to report on a nine-point scale their
assessment regarding the likelihood that the PCAOB would scrutinize the client’s fair
value estimate, where 1 = PCAOB would not scrutinize and 9 = PCAOB would definitely
scrutinize. Second, participants are asked to report on a nine-point scale how risky their
client is (compared to the population of all possible clients), where, 1 = minimum risk
and 9 = maximum risk.
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3.5.6 Accountability
Prior research demonstrates that accountability may influence the judgments of
auditors (e.g., Kennedy 1993). Hoffman and Patton (1997) find that auditors tend to shift
their judgments towards what they foresee will be defensible to their superiors, resulting
in more conservative fraud risk judgments. This suggests that auditors respond to
anticipated scrutiny with conservatism. Thus, as estimation uncertainty increases,
auditors may generate conservative estimates as a means of protecting themselves from
scrutiny. To control for accountability effects, I include two questions aimed at capturing
participants’ perceptions of accountability. The first question asks auditors to report how
motivated they were to give answers which they could justify. This question is measured
using a nine-point scale where 1 = not at all motivated and 9 = extremely motivated. The
second question asks auditor to report the likelihood that someone (e.g., a supervisor)
would contact them regarding their recommendations related to the client’s fair value
estimate. This question is measured using a nine-point scale where 1 = someone would
definitely not contact me and 9 = someone would definitely contact me.
3.5.7 Goal Commitment
Prior literature has found that goal commitment can influence the effect of
directional goals on auditors’ reporting decisions. For example, Church (1991) finds that
level of commitment to their hypotheses affected auditors’ overall evaluations of mixed
evidence. Specifically, Church finds that auditors with high commitment to their
hypotheses attached more importance to confirming evidence than those who where not
strongly committed. Interestingly, Church does not find differences of importance among
auditors in regard to disconfirming evidence. Kadous et al. (2003) also find that auditors
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are more likely to identify the client’s method as the most appropriate method when they
are more committed to their directional goals. Thus, it is possible that goal commitment
will differentially affect the importance that auditors give to confirming and
disconfirming evidence. Consistent with Kadous et al. (2003), I use a 5-question measure
of goal commitment. This 5-question scale was originally developed by Klein et al.
(2001). The goal commitment measures are shown below in Table 2.
Table 2: Goal Commitment Measures
completely
disagree neutral
agree
completely
disagree
somewhat
somewhat
agree
1) I thought this was
a good goal to shoot
for.
2) I was strongly
committed to
pursuing this goal.
3) It was hard to take
this goal seriously.*
4) Quite frankly, I
didn’t care if I
achieved this goal or
not.*
5) It wouldn’t have
taken much to make
me abandon this
goal.*
The five items above were applied to one of the following three goals which matched
the experimental condition to which participants were assigned.
Goal: Find support for management’s assertions about the fair value estimate.
(Support condition)
Goal: Find reasons for why management’s assertions about the fair value estimate
might not be reasonable. (Disconfirm condition)
Goal: Identify the estimate that would be most appropriate in the eyes of external
users. (Generate own condition)
* Items 3, 4, and 5 were reverse-scored.
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3.6 Task
The case, adapted from Kohlbeck et al. (2009), involves a fair value estimation
task where participants were required to review a potential impairment of an intangible
asset (reacquired franchise rights). This case was selected for several reasons. First, the
fair value estimation in the case relies heavily on management’s assumptions, thus
allowing for the manipulation of estimation uncertainty by varying the extent of
sensitivity of the FVE to changes in management’s assumptions. Second, the case was
originally derived and adapted from an actual transaction recorded by Krispy Kreme
Doughnuts, Inc., adding realism to the case. Third, interviews with partners/shareholders
from a Big Four firm and a large regional firm revealed that evaluations of fair value
estimates for intangible assets is common for auditors, thus enhancing the generalizability
of the results.
The case involved reviewing assumptions made by management in deriving its
fair value estimate for reacquired franchise rights. The case materials consisted of the
following items: (1) company background and financial information, (2) the audit task,
and (3) the evidence available to management for making its assumptions and deriving
the FVE. The company background and financial information described the client’s
business (including franchising activities), and presented selected account balances and
disclosures before audit adjustments. The audit task described the audit firm’s
relationship with the client and informed participants of the audit guidance relevant to the
audit of the FVE. This section also detailed the participant’s assignment which included
instructions to: (1) evaluate management’s key assumptions by searching for and
reviewing evidence which favors and disfavors management’s estimate, and (2) save the
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evidence items which they would cite in a memo to be retained in the working papers as
evidence that they have complied with the audit standard.
The case materials included management’s reported book value, the estimated fair
value, a summary of the four assumptions made by management in estimating the FVE,
and evidence either favoring or disfavoring management’s FVE. The evidence was
organized by assumption with six pieces of evidence for each assumption. Three pieces
of evidence favored management’s estimate while the other three pieces disfavored
management’s estimate. The organization of the evidence was randomized to control for
order effects.
Participants were given ten minutes to search through the evidence and to save the
pieces they wished to include in the work paper file. The purpose of the time limit was to
simulate time pressures faced by auditors on audit engagements. Pilot testing with Ph.D.
students revealed that 10 minutes allowed sufficient time for participants to review
evidence, but not so much time that they could view all of the available evidence. Upon
completion of search, participants reported (1) the perceived risk of material
misstatement related to management’s FVE, and (2) a recommended adjustment (if any)
to management’s FVE. Participants then completed a post-experimental questionnaire
that included manipulation checks and demographic questions.
3.7 Participants
Professional auditors were recruited to participate in the study. Interviews with
partners from a Big 4 firm and a large regional firm indicated that all levels of auditors
(including staff auditors) should have sufficient fair value auditing knowledge to perform
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the task. In addition, undergraduate auditing students participated in both the pilot study
and the main study.
3.8 Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted using undergraduate accounting students enrolled in
an Audit I course. The primary purpose of the pilot study was to ensure that the
manipulations had their intended effects. Despite evidence that the manipulation check
questions may not have been clear to participants, data from the pilot study revealed
support for the hypothesized effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on
extent of agreement with management’s estimate. A secondary purpose of the pilot study
was to be sure that the experimental materials were complete and understandable prior to
computerization. The pilot study also provided information for setting time limits for the
evidence evaluation phase. Due to the purposes of the pilot study and the limited
participant pool, only two forms of guidance were tested in the pilot study: support
management’s estimate and generate own estimate. Several modifications to the
experimental case were made and incorporated into the final computerized version. These
modifications are discussed in Section 3.8.7.
3.8.1 Research Design (Pilot Study)
The pilot study employed a 2 x 2 factorial design with two forms of audit
guidance (support management’s estimate and generate own estimate) and two levels of
estimation uncertainty (low and high). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
treatment conditions and completed a paper-based version of the task described in
Section 3.6.
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3.8.2 Treatments/Independent Variables (Pilot Study)
The first independent variable, audit guidance, was varied as either directional or
non-directional as follows:
Directional guidance – “The audit standard related to the audit of intangible
assets directs you to obtain evidence supporting management’s assertions about
the fair value of the reacquired franchise rights.”
Non-directional guidance – “The audit standard related to the audit of intangible
assets directs you to obtain your own reasonable range of outcomes with which to
evaluate management’s assertions about the fair value of the reacquired franchise
rights.”
The second independent variable, estimation uncertainty, is varied at two levels,
low and high. For the pilot study, uncertainty was manipulated by explicitly telling
participants that the fair value estimate involves low (high) uncertainty because
management’s assumptions are based on data from external (internal) sources, depend on
little (much) judgment, and has little (high) sensitivity to changes in assumptions.
Further, the evidence items provided in the case materials were manipulated to reflect the
respective level of uncertainty.
3.8.3 Dependent Variables (Pilot Study)
Two measures of confirmation bias were developed for the pilot study. The first
measure of confirmation bias was the extent to which participants agree with
management’s fair value estimate (AGREE). This measure ranges from 1 = “strongly
disagree” to 8 = “strongly agree.” A higher number represents a greater extent of
confirmation bias. A second measure of confirmation bias was constructed to assess
confirmation bias during information search (SEARCH). This dependent variable is
measured as the total amount of confirming evidence viewed minus the total amount of
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disconfirming evidence viewed, divided by total evidence viewed. A larger and more
positive percentage represents a greater extent of confirmation bias.
3.8.4 Manipulation Checks (Pilot Study)
To assess whether participants understood the audit guidance, participants were
asked whether the audit guidance they received told them to support management’s
estimate, disconfirm management’s estimate, or neither support nor disconfirm
management’s estimate. Only 38 percent of participants responded correctly to this
manipulation check question. While this may suggest that participants did not attend to or
understand the audit guidance manipulation, results show that there were differences
between these groups and the differences were in the predicted direction. Results from
debriefing with participants suggest that the manipulation check question was unclear.
This question was revised in the instrument to say, “The relevant audit guidance (i.e.,
audit standards and your firm’s policies) for the evaluation of fair value estimates
requires you to obtain evidence: (1) supporting management’s assertion, (2) opposing
management’s assertions, or (3) developing your own independent estimate.”
To assess whether participants attended to the uncertainty manipulation,
participants were asked whether management’s FVE for reacquired franchise rights
involved low or high uncertainty. Only 75 percent of participants passed this
manipulation check. As a result, this manipulation was made more salient in the webbased instrument developed for the experiment by (1) explicitly telling participants that
the FVE involves low or high estimation uncertainty, and (2) providing sensitivity
analysis which develops a range to be used in evaluating management’s point estimate.
The purpose of the range is to highlight the sensitivity of the estimate to changes in
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management’s assumptions. The broader the range, the more sensitive the estimate is to
changes in management’s assumptions.
3.8.5 Participants (Pilot Study)
Participants for the pilot study were 45 undergraduate accounting students
enrolled in an Audit I course at a large university. 10 These students were selected for the
pilot study because of their knowledge of fair value estimation (covered in an
Intermediate I course), and their knowledge of audit requirements (covered in the first
half of the Audit I course). Self-reports indicate that, on average, the students had eight
years of general work experience, however, only one participant had worked in auditing.
Further, only one participant had experience auditing fair value estimates. Eighty-nine
percent of students had taken a course that covered fair value accounting.
3.8.6 Results (Pilot Study)
3.8.6.1 Descriptive Statistics (Pilot Study)
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, by treatment condition, of the types of
evidence participants viewed and saved during the evidence evaluation phase.
Participants in the Support/Low Uncertainty condition viewed an average of 8.4 favoring
items and 7.3 disfavoring items, while participants in the Support/High Uncertainty
condition viewed an average of 9.6 favoring items and 6.5 disfavoring items. Participants
in the Generate Own/Low Uncertainty condition viewed an average of 9.8 favoring items
and 7.8 disfavoring items, and participants in the Generate Own/High Uncertainty
condition viewed an average of 8.8 favoring items and 7.6 disfavoring items. In total,
participants could view up to 24 evidence items; thus, results suggest that participants did

10

Eighty-four students participated over a total of three sessions; however, 39 students (Session 1) were
dropped from the analysis because of the time-limit issue discussed in the previous section.
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not view all available items. Given the limitations of a paper-based instrument, it is not
clear whether participants ended the search voluntarily or at expiration of the time-limit.
Based on the researcher’s observation, it is most likely that participants ended their
search when they were instructed to do so at the end of seven minutes.
Table 3: Mean Values (Standard Deviations) of Information Searched and Saved in
the Work paper File
Support/
Support/
Generate
Generate Own/
Low
High
Own/
High
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Low
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
a
b
C
D
C
D
C
D
C
D
Average
Number of
8.37
7.27
9.64
6.45
9.82
7.82
8.83
7.58
Evidence
n=11
n=11
n=11
n=11 n=11 n=11
n=12
n=12
Items
(1.81) (1.00) (2.01) (3.11) (2.09) (4.29) (1.59) (2.19)
Viewed
(SEARCH)
Average
Number of
Evidence
4.18
3.45
3.82
3.36
5.27
5.09
4.67
4.67
Items Saved n=11
n=11
n=11
n=11 n=11 n=11
n=12
n=12
to Work
(2.18) (1.97) (2.40) (2.62) (2.94) (3.53) (2.19) (2.02)
Paper File
(SAVE)
a
C=Confirming Evidence
b
D=Disconfirming Evidence
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the two dependent variables, AGREE
and SEARCH. Recall that AGREE measures confirmation bias by the extent to which
participants agree with management’s estimate and a higher value indicates greater
confirmation bias. SEARCH is a standardized measure of search emphasis on favoring
versus disfavoring evidence.

64

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (AGREE) and (SEARCH)
Support/
Support/
Generate Own/ Generate Own/
Low Uncertainty
High
Low
High
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
Uncertainty
a
AGREE
Mean
4.091
5.182
3.818
3.833
Std. Dev.
(1.375)
(1.079)
(0.874)
(1.467)
b
SEARCH
Mean
0.063
0.228
0.187
0.085
Std. Dev.
(0.148)
(0.213)
(0.361)
(0.163)
a
AGREE = The extent to which participants agree with management’s fair value estimate
(1=strongly disagree,8=strongly agree)
b
SEARCH = Standardized measure of search emphasis on confirming versus
disconfirming evidence (Confirming Evidence-Disconfirming Evidence)/Total Evidence
Viewed
3.8.6.2 Test of Hypotheses (Pilot Study)
I test my hypotheses using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) as shown in Table 5.
Table 6 summarizes the relationships tested in the pilot study. Given that the primary
purpose of the pilot study was to test the salience of the manipulations and the
understandability of the task, the pilot materials did not include questions related to all of
the covariates identified for the study. As a result, covariates are not included in the
analyses described below.
Table 5: The Overall Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty on
Extent of Agreement with Management’s Fair Value Estimate (AGREE) and
Information Search (SEARCH)
Panel A – Analysis of Variance – Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation
Uncertainty on AGREE
Source
df
SS
F
p
Corrected Model
3
4.643
3.078
.038
Audit Guidance
1
7.382
4.893
.033
Estimation Uncertainty
1
3.436
2.278
.139
Audit Guidance*Estimation
1
3.250
2.155
.150
Uncertainty
Error
41
61.848
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Table 5: The Overall Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty on
Extent of Agreement with Management’s Fair Value Estimate (AGREE) and
Information Search (SEARCH) (continued)
Panel B – Analysis of Variance – Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation
Uncertainty on SEARCH
Source
df
SS
F
p
Corrected Model
3
.071
1.274
.296
Audit Guidance
1
.001
.018
.895
Estimation Uncertainty
1
.011
.202
.656
Audit Guidance*Estimation
1
.201
3.627
.064
Uncertainty
Error
41
2.276
Table 6: Tests of Expected Relationships
Audit Guidance
DirectionallyAccuracy-Driven
Driven (Support) (Generate Own)
Uncertainty

AC>BD

Low
Uncertainty
High
Uncertainty

Main effect of Audit
Guidance on Extent of
Agreement
AC>BD Main effect of Audit
Guidance on Information
Search
measured Main effect of search
variable
strategy on Extent of
Agreement
CD>AB Main effect of
Uncertainty on Extent of
Agreement
C>A, B, Moderating effect of
D
Uncertainty on Main
Effect of Audit Guidance

A

B

AB

C
AC

D
BD

CD

ANOVA – main effect
test

Supported
(F = 4.893, p =
.033)
ANOVA – main effect
Not Supported
test
Model not
Significant
ANOVA – main effect
Not Supported
test
Model not
Significant
ANOVA – main effect
Not Supported
test
(F = 2.278, p =
.139)
ANOVA – interaction
Not Supported
test
Model not
Planned Comparisons (t- Significant
tests)

First, I discuss the results of a 2 x 2 ANOVA testing the effects of audit guidance
and estimation uncertainty on extent of agreement with management’s estimate (Table 5,
Panel A). The pilot study investigated whether auditors presented with directional
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guidance to support management’s estimate will agree with management’s estimate to a
greater extent than auditors presented with non-directional guidance to generate their own
estimate. This test result (F = 4.893, p = 0.033) indicates that auditors exhibit
confirmation bias to a greater extent when they are told to support management’s
estimate (mean = 4.64) compared to when they are told to generate their own estimate
(mean = 3.83).
I also investigated whether auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving
high uncertainty will agree with the estimate to a greater extent than auditors evaluating a
fair value estimate involving low uncertainty. While the mean values are in the direction
expected, test results are not significant at conventional levels (F = 2.278, p = 0.139).
An interaction effect between guidance and estimation uncertainty on extent of
agreement with management’s estimate was tested. The interaction term is not significant
at conventional levels (F = 2.155, p = 0.150).
The remaining tests relate to the effects of audit guidance and estimation
uncertainty on information search, as well as the effect of information search on extent of
agreement with management’s estimate. Specifically, I test whether auditors presented
with directional guidance to support management’s estimate will focus their search on
confirming evidence versus disconfirming evidence to a greater extent than auditors
presented with non-directional guidance to generate their own estimate. In the first
remaining test I investigate whether auditors whose information search emphasizes
confirming evidence will agree with management’s estimate to a greater extent than
auditors whose information search emphasizes disconfirming evidence. In addition, I
examine the possibility of an interaction effect between audit guidance and uncertainty on
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information search. None of these tests were conclusive as the overall models were not
statistically significant. I conducted a power analysis for each of the tested relationships
and found that the observed power was too low to detect an effect. This may be due to
small sample sizes (i.e., 11-12 participants per treatment cell) or lack of requisite
knowledge by participants completing the task. Despite the low power, I conducted
additional analyses to determine whether the means were in the predicted directions.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for information searched and information saved
in the work paper file. These statistics show that on average, all conditions viewed more
confirming than disconfirming evidence.
The 2 x 2 ANOVA results presented in Table 5 Panel B show that the model was
not statistically significant (F = 1.274, p = 0.296) so my subsequent interpretation of the
results should be considered inconclusive. The interaction term had a marginally
significant p-value (F = 3.627, p = 0.064) and it is possible that this effect would be
observed with increased power. To further examine the potential of an interaction effect,
I analyzed post hoc comparisons between the cell means and found that participants
instructed to support management’s estimate in the high uncertainty condition
emphasized confirming evidence over disconfirming evidence to a greater extent than all
other conditions (p = 0.108).
3.9 Implications of the Pilot Study
Overall, the pilot study finds that participants receiving directional audit guidance
telling them to support management’s FVE tended to agree more with management’s
estimate than did participants receiving non-directional audit guidance telling them to
generate their own estimate. Estimation uncertainty, however, had no effect on auditors’
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extent of agreement with management’s estimate. These results, however, should be
interpreted with caution as many of the models tested were not statistically significant.
Given the limited scope and purpose of the pilot study, the results are subject to
other limitations. First, evidence, including interviews with student participants, revealed
that the manipulations and manipulation check questions were not clear to participants.
Several changes were made to the instrument and the post-experimental questionnaire to
improve the salience of the manipulations and to clarify the manipulation check
questions. Second, the pilot study utilized a paper-based instrument which limited the
ability to investigate participants’ search processes. A customized web-based instrument
was developed for the full experiment which allowed for the collection of richer data
regarding participants’ search strategies. The web-based instrument was pilot tested by
five Ph.D. students and two faculty members prior to making it available to study
participants. Last, the web-based instrument was expanded to include measures of the
covariates identified in Section 3.5.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the tests of hypotheses. Details regarding the
data collection and sample selection process are provided first, followed by a discussion
of the participant demographics and manipulation checks. The tests of the study’s
hypotheses are described next. The chapter concludes with a discussion of alternative
tests performed to test the robustness of the findings.
4.2 Background and Descriptive Statistics
I collected data over a two-month period using a customized web-based survey
instrument. Participants included 30 professional auditors and 101 auditing students. The
professional auditors were recruited via an e-mail sent to 21 School of Accountancy
advisory council members of a large public university in the southeastern United States.
The e-mail requested advisory council members to forward the survey instrument to
auditors within their firms.
Forty-three auditor attempts were recorded on the website; 30 auditors completed
all questions. Of these 30 auditors, three were excluded from the analyses based on their
recorded time spent viewing task instructions and background information. Pilot testing
revealed that participants required approximately three minutes to read both the client
background and financial information, as well as the audit task instructions. Thus, I felt
confident that participants who spent 60 seconds or less on either of these sections did not
put forth the effort necessary to understand the task. Consequently, three auditors who
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spent less than 60 seconds on these sections were excluded from the analyses, leaving 27
total auditors in the sample.
The auditing students were recruited from three undergraduate audit courses at the
same large public university. The three courses were Audit I, Audit II, and Internal
Control Auditing. One-hundred and eighty-two attempts were recorded on the website;
however, only 101 students completed all questions. Of these 101 students, 25 were
excluded from the analyses because they spent less than 60 seconds viewing either the
client background and financial information, or the audit task instructions. Finally, one
student participant was identified as an influential outlier (discussed in Section 4.2.3),
and was excluded from the analyses. The final sample is depicted below in Table 7.
Upon login, participants were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment
conditions. The web program was designed to fill the treatment cells sequentially to
enhance the likelihood of obtaining balanced cell sizes. Following the data screening,
however, the final sample as reflected in Table 6 did not retain balanced cell sizes. This
can potentially affect the robustness of the statistical analyses, thus the data were
screened for adherence to the assumptions underlying MANOVA and regression.
Table 7: Description of Final Sample
Panel A – Participants Included in Sample
Total number of recorded survey attempts
Total number of incomplete surveys
Total number of participants dropped for insufficient effort
Total number of participants identified as extreme outliers
Total number of participants retained for the analyses
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Auditors
43
-13
-3
0

Students
182
-81
-25
-1

27

75

Table 7: Description of Final Sample (continued)
Panel B – Number of Participants in each Treatment Condition
Audit Guidance
Support
Oppose
Generate Own
Estimation
Uncertainty
A=6
A=3
A=6
Low
S = 11
S = 12
S = 14
C = 17
C = 15
C = 20
A=5
A=3
A=4
High
S = 15
S=9
S = 14
C = 20
C = 12
C = 18
A = 11
A=6
A = 10
Total
S = 26
S = 21
S = 28
C = 37
C = 27
C = 38
A = auditors, S = students, C = combined

Total
A = 15
S = 37
C = 52
A = 12
S = 38
C = 50
A = 27
S = 75
C = 102

Table 7, Panel A shows that the 27 auditors retained in the sample included 9
staff, 12 seniors, 4 managers, and 2 partners. Almost half (14) of the auditors worked for
an international firm. Twelve auditors held a bachelor’s degree in accounting, 13 held a
master’s degree in accounting, and one auditor held a master’s degree in another field.
Mean audit experience for the auditors was 5.26 years, while the mean number of times
that auditors had evaluated a fair value estimate was 2.19 times. This suggests that the
auditors had relatively little experience in evaluating fair values. On a scale of one to
nine, where one is not at all knowledgeable and nine is extremely knowledgeable,
auditors’ mean self-reported fair value knowledge was 4.59.
Table 7, Panel B shows that the mean work experience for the 75 students
retained in the sample was 6.77 years and the mean audit experience was 0.18 years,
indicating that the majority of students had no audit experience. Only one student had
work experience related to fair values; however, 72 students had taken a college course
that covered fair value accounting.
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An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare evidence search time
for auditors and students. There was no significant difference in minutes of search time
between auditors (M=6.33, SD=1.73) and students (M=5.74, SD=1.93; t(100)=1.40,
p=.17). Further, fair value experience was not a significant explanatory variable in the
analyses. Based on these factors, participants were combined in the subsequent statistical
analyses. Additionally, when sample size is small (e.g., n=20), it is possible that a nonsignificant result is due to insufficient power (Stevens 2007). Such is the case with the
auditor participants (n=27). For example, a power analysis revealed that there was only a
27 percent chance of detecting a main effect of audit guidance on confirmation bias when
the analyses included only the 27 auditor participants. This percentage increased to 78
percent when the auditor responses were combined with student responses. Given the
similarities in search patterns and fair value experience between auditors and students,
and in the interest of increasing confidence in the results, all participants were combined
in the analyses.
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Table 8: Participant Demographics for Confirmation Bias Hypotheses Tests
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics for Auditor Participants (n=27)
Evidence Search Time (minutes)
Mean
6.33
Standard Deviation
1.73
Minimum
0.81
Maximum
8.79
Audit Experience (# of years)
Mean
5.26
Standard Deviation
6.55
Minimum
.83
Maximum
32
FV Experience (# of times)
Mean
2.19
Standard Deviation
2.69
Minimum
0
Maximum
10
FV Knowledge (1=not at all knowledgeable,
9=extremely
knowledgeable)
Mean
4.59
Standard Deviation
1.62
Minimum
1
Maximum
7
Firm Size
Local
4
Regional
6
National
3
International
14
Auditor Rank
Staff
9
Senior
12
Manager
4
Partner
2
Highest Education Level*
BS/BBA Accounting
12
Master of Accounting
13
Master – Other
1
* = 1 missing data point
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Table 8: Participant Demographics for Confirmation Bias Hypotheses Tests
(continued)
Panel B – Descriptive Statistics for Student Participants (n=75)
Evidence Search Time (minutes)
Mean
5.74
Standard Deviation
1.93
Minimum
0.23
Maximum
8.49
Work Experience (# of years)
Mean
6.77
Standard Deviation
5.86
Minimum
0
Maximum
25
Audit Experience (# of years)
Mean
.18
Standard Deviation
.66
Minimum
0
Maximum
5
Fair Value Work Experience
Yes
1
No
74
Fair Value Classroom Experience
Yes
72
No
3
Two manipulation check questions were included in the survey instrument. The
first question related to the audit guidance manipulation. This question asked participants
whether the relevant audit guidance (i.e., audit standards and the firm’s policies) for
evaluation of the fair value estimated required that the auditor obtain evidence supporting
management’s assertions, opposing management’s assertions, or develop their own
independent estimate. Sixty-four percent of total participants answered this question
correctly (67 percent of auditors and 63 percent of students). Of the 36 percent who
missed this question, 51 percent were in the “support” condition, 33 percent were in the
“oppose” condition, and 16 percent were in the “generate own estimate” condition.
Seventy-seven percent of participants who missed the manipulation check question in the
“support” and “oppose” conditions selected “generate own” as the correct answer. This

75

evidence supports my suspicion that the placement of the manipulation check question
within the instrument may have confused participants. Prior to the manipulation check
question, participants are asked whether they would recommend an adjustment to the
client’s reported book value for reacquired franchise rights, and if so, for how much. It is
likely that participants interpreted this question as an instruction to generate their own
estimate and subsequently answered the manipulation check question with this
understanding in mind. Given the potential that the manipulation check question was
unclear, no participants were excluded from the analyses even if they answered the
manipulation check question incorrectly.
The second manipulation check question related to the degree of estimation
uncertainty inherent in the estimate. This question asked participants whether the fair
value estimate in the task involved low or high uncertainty. Sixty-six percent of total
participants responded to this question correctly (56 percent of auditors and 70 percent of
students). Of the 34 percent who answered incorrectly, 80 percent were in the low
condition while only 20 percent were in the high condition. Further analysis reveals that
53 percent of participants in the low condition felt that the fair value estimate involved
high uncertainty. This trend suggests that many of the participants in the low estimation
uncertainty condition considered the fair value estimate to be highly uncertain, regardless
of the information provided in the task. This is not an unreasonable perception given that
the determination of the fair value of an intangible asset is more uncertain than other fair
value estimates. Additionally, as noted previously, the participants lacked much
experience with fair value estimation and therefore may have considered the task in
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general to involve a high level of uncertainty. Given that this manipulation check could
also be considered unclear, all participants were included in the following analyses.
4.3 Tests of Confirmation Bias Hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d)
Prior to testing the hypotheses, the data were examined for any violations of
statistical assumptions related to multivariate analysis of variance and linear regression.
Due to correlations among the dependent variables (discussed in the next section), it was
determined that multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was an appropriate
approach for testing Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. It was also determined that linear
regression was an appropriate approach for testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 (See Figure 4).
Following is a description of the preliminary data analyses, as well as detailed
discussions of the MANOVA and regressions employed to test the hypotheses.
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Figure 4: Statistical Approach to Testing the Hypotheses
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4.3.1 Correlation Analyses
The approach used to examine correlations depends on whether the dependent
variables are normally distributed. Analysis of normality (discussed in the next section)
indicates that the dependent variables are not normally distributed, thus a Spearman rank
correlation matrix was used to examine correlations. Table 9, which presents the
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients for the dependent variables, shows that the
dependent variables are moderately to highly correlated. This provides support for using
a multivariate approach to test the confirmation bias hypotheses (H1a, b, c, and d).
Table 9: Correlation Matrix for the Confirmation Bias Dependent Variables
Spearman Rank Correlations
Complete Data Set (n=102)
TIMESTD
VIEWSTD
SAVED
TIMESTDa
1.000
.787**
.556**
b
VIEWSTD
1.000
.646**
c
SAVED
1.000
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
a
TIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence
divided by total time, in seconds
b
VIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of
opposing evidence divided by total views
c
SAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
Correlations between the dependent variables and the potential covariates were
examined to determine whether any covariates should be included in the analyses.
Stevens (2007) suggests that covariate variables that are highly correlated (e.g., .80) with
the dependent variable should be included in the analyses. Examination of the
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients revealed that none of the covariates were highly
correlated with the dependent variables, thus no covariates were included in the tests of
hypotheses. Descriptive statistics for the potential covariates are presented in Table 10.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Potential Covariates
(n=102)
Mean
Minimum
Maximum

Range

Standard
Deviation
a
PSTrait
138.86
80
170
90
13.59
AITraitb
56.77
36
77
41
8.76
c
CONF
5.33
1
9
8
1.79
RiskPCd
5.96
1
9
8
1.88
e
RiskCL
5.2
2
8
6
1.70
f
JUSTIF
6.61
1
9
8
1.48
ACCOUNTg
6.14
2
9
7
1.86
h
GOAL
19.36
8
25
17
3.54
a
PSTrait = Participants’ general propensity to be skeptical was measured using the Hurtt
(2007) scale. Scores can range from 30 to180; higher scores equate to greater skepticism.
b
AITrait = Participants’ ambiguity intolerance was measured using the Budner (1962)
scale. Scores can range from 16 to 112; higher scores indicate a greater intolerance of
ambiguity.
c
CONF = Participants’ assessment of how confident they feel about their assessment of
management’s fair value estimate, where 1 = not at all confident and 9 = extremely
confident.
d
RiskPC = Participants’ assessment of the likelihood that the PCAOB would scrutinize
the client’s fair value estimate, where 1 = PCAOB would not scrutinize and 9 = PCAOB
would definitely scrutinize.
e
RiskCL = Participants’ assessment of how risky the client is (compared to the population
of all possible clients), where 1 = minimum risk and 9 = maximum risk.
f
JUSTIF = Participants’ assessment of how motivated they were to give answers which
they could justify, where 1 = not at all motivated and 9 = extremely motivated.
g
ACCOUNT = Participants’ assessment of the likelihood that someone (e.g., a
supervisor) would contact them regarding their recommendations related to the client’s
fair value estimate, where 1 = someone would definitely not contact me and 9 = someone
would definitely contact me.
h
GOAL = Participants’ assessment of the extent to which they are committed to their
respective goals outlined in the audit guidance and firm policies. Scores can range from 0
to 25; higher scores indicate a greater degree of goal commitment.
4.3.2 Tests of Normality
Multivariate analysis relies on an assumption that the dependent variables are
normally distributed (Mendenhall and Sincich 2003). To assess multivariate normality of
the dependent variables, I first evaluated whether each dependent variable exhibited
univariate normality. The rationale for testing each dependent variable individually is that
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if the dependent variables each exhibit univariate normality, then in combination they
should be normally distributed. To test for univariate normality I used two statistical
tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov with Lilliefors significance correction and Shapiro-Wilk. For
both of these tests, a non-significant result indicates normality. As shown in Table 11,
only SAVED is normally distributed. These tests, however, may be of limited use as they
are highly sensitive to minor departures from normality (Mendenhall and Sincich 2003).
Therefore, I also relied on histograms to assess normality for each of the dependent
variables. Visual inspection of the data revealed patterns of a bell-shaped curve for each
of the dependent variables used to measure confirmation bias (TIME, VIEW, and
SAVED), indicating distributions were relatively normal.
Table 11: Tests of Normality for Confirmation Bias Dependent Variables
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic
df
Significance
Statistic
df
Significance
Depende
nt
Variable
TIMEb
.179
103
.000
.906
103
.000
c
VIEWS
.173
103
.000
.847
103
.000
d
SAVED
.116
103
.002
.981
103
.151
a
Lilliefors Significance Correction
b
TIME = Time spent viewing confirming evidence minus time spent viewing opposing
evidence, in seconds
c
VIEWS = Number of views of confirming evidence minus number of views of opposing
evidence
d
SAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
The data were screened for extreme outliers that could affect normality.
Histograms and box plots revealed 11 potential outliers. Each of these outliers was
analyzed and it was determined that only one of these outliers was suspect. Further
screening using Mahalanobis distances corroborated this result, thus, the suspect outlier
was removed from the analyses, resulting in the final sample of 102, which is used in all
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analyses. To test the sensitivity of the results to the suspect outlier, the analyses were
repeated with the outlier and the levels of significance reported were qualitatively similar.
One option for dealing with any remaining non-normality is to standardize the
dependent variables. To standardize the TIME variable, I divided the total time spent
viewing confirming evidence less time spent viewing opposing evidence by the total
amount of time spent viewing evidence. This new variable was called TIMESTD. I
applied a similar approach to standardize the VIEW variable. Specifically, I divided the
total number of views of confirming evidence minus the number of views of opposing
evidence by the total number of views. This new variable was called VIEWSTD.
Following these transformations, histograms indicated an improvement in the distribution
of the data. Visual inspection and the robustness of the methods being used indicates that
interpretation of the results is not unduly influenced by the remaining non-normality.
Therefore, the standardized variables are used in the analyses.
4.3.3 Homogeneity of Variance-Covariance Matrices
The second assumption of MANOVA is the equality of the variance-covariance
matrices. I used the Box’s M Test to test the null hypothesis that the observed covariance
matrices of the dependent variables are equal across all groups. A significance value
above .001 indicates that the assumption is not violated (Pallant 2005, 258). My results
indicate a significance value of .128, suggesting that the assumption has been met. This
result should be interpreted with caution, however, because the Box’s M Test relies on
normality.
I also used Levene’s test of equality of variances to test the null hypothesis that
the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. A significance value
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of less than .05 indicates that the error variances are not equal (Mendenhall and Sincich
2003). As shown in Table 12, the dependent variables TIMESTD and VIEWSTD violate
the equality of error variances criteria. An analysis of the variance-covariance matrices
for TIMESTD and VIEWSTD (untabulated) indicates that stated significance levels
related to these variables are slightly conservative. According to Hair et al. (1998) if the
largest variance is associated with the smallest treatment group the power of the test is
reduced indicating that the alpha is somewhat understated.
Table 12: Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances
F
df1
df2
Sig.
a
TIMESTD
1.720
5
97
.003
VIEWSTDb
2.187
5
97
.001
c
SAVED
2.594
5
97
.230
a
TIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence
divided by total time, in seconds
b
VIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of
opposing evidence divided by total views
c
SAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
4.3.4 Additional Considerations for MANOVA
While not considered assumptions of MANOVA, there are additional issues that
contribute to the goodness or validity of the MANOVA, including independence of the
observations, sample size, linearity, and multicollinearity. Each of these is discussed
below.
Independence of the observations was achieved by randomly assigning
participants to one of six treatments. Furthermore, participants completed the survey on
their own time, minimizing the risk of participants influencing each other in a business or
classroom setting.
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Linearity refers to a straight line relationship between each pair of the dependent
variables. A visual examination of scatterplots indicated that linear relationships were
present.
MANOVA is more powerful when the dependent variables are only moderately
correlated. When the dependent variables are highly correlated, there may be
multicollinearity problems and one of the dependent variables should be dropped. An
examination of Pearson correlation coefficients indicates that TIMESTD and VIEWSTD
are highly correlated (0.906), thus separate ANOVAs will be used to test the robustness
of the MANOVA in Section 4.3.5.3.
4.3.5 MANOVA Results
4.3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Confirmation bias is measured using three dependent variables: TIMESTD,
VIEWSTD, and SAVED. The descriptive statistics for these three variables are reported
below in Tables 13 and 14. Table 13 provides the descriptive statistics for the
unstandardized dependent variables TIME, VIEWS, and SAVED; whereas, Table 14
provides descriptive statistics for the standardized values of TIME and VIEWS. The
standardized values of TIME and VIEWS are used in the subsequent analyses because
these values more closely adhere to the assumptions of MANOVA.
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Evidence Viewed and Saved
Panel A - Means [Medians] (Range) of TIME spent viewing evidence
Audit Guidance
Support
Oppose
Generate Own
Estimation
Uncertainty
Ca = 198.32
C = 138
C = 171
Low
[205.71] (271)
[150.97] (254)
[163.51] (285)
Db = 149.17
D = 213.53
D = 172.69
[134.28] (261)
[231.38] (378)
[160.47] (394)
Nc = 49.15
N = -75.53
N = -1.69
[28.97] (311)
[-28.69] (389)
[-.82] (627)
n = 17
n = 15
n = 20
C = 170.59
C = 141.03
C = 177.67
High
[192.30] (274)
[160.01] (350)
[172.98] (198)
D = 160.45
D = 236.17
D = 177.61
[175.67] (265)
[241.44] (272)
[192.66] (286)
N = 10.13
N = -95.14
N = 0.06
[-2.39] (282)
[-87.39] (561)
[13.06] (278)
n = 20
n = 12
n = 18
Panel B - Means [Medians] (Range) of VIEWS of evidence
Audit Guidance
Support
Oppose
Generate Own
Estimation
Uncertainty
Ca= 14.12 [13.0] (34) C = 8.80 [10.0] (12) C = 13.30 [13.0] (18)
Low
Db = 9.47 [10.0] (12) D = 12.00 [12.0] (17) D = 13.45 [12.0] (26)
Nc = 4.63 [1.0] (38)
N = -3.20 [-1.0] (23)
N = -.15 [0.0] (21)
n = 17
n = 15
n = 20
C = 13.45 [13.5] (17)
C = 8.50 [8.5] (16)
C = 13.50 [13.0] (15)
High
D = 10.50 [12.0] (18) D = 12.25 [12.0] (15) D = 12.78 [12.5] (16)
N = 4.64 [1.0] (25)
N = -3.75 [-2.5] (22)
N = 0.72 [1.00] (18)
n = 20
n = 12
n = 18
Panel C - Means [Medians] (Range) of Evidence SAVED to the Work Paper File
Audit Guidance
Support
Oppose
Generate Own
Estimation
Uncertainty
Ca = 4.24 [4.0] (10)
C = 3.07 [2.0] (11)
C = 4.94 [5.0] (12)
Low
Db = 3.18 [3.0] (9)
D = 6.40 [6.0] (10)
D = 5.20 [5.00] (12)
Nc = 1.06 [0.0] (14)
N = -3.33 [-4.0] (10)
N = -.90 [-2.0] (18)
n = 17
n = 15
n = 20
C = 4.0 [3.0] (11)
C = 2.17 [2.5] (4)
C = 4.94 [5.0] (12)
High
D = 4.60 [5.0] (11)
D = 7.0 [6.5] (11)
D = 5.94 [6.0] (12)
N = -0.60 [0.50] (16) N = -4.83 [-4.5] (15) N = -0.83 [-0.50] (10)
n = 20
n = 12
n = 18
a

C = confirming evidence
D = disconfirming evidence
c
N = net difference between confirming and disconfirming evidence
b
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables by Experimental Condition
Panel A - Means (Standard Deviations) of Dependent Variable – TIMESTD*
Audit Guidance
Support
Oppose
Generate Own
Total
Estimation
Uncertainty
0.14
-0.17
0.02
0.01
Low
(0.34)
(0.39)
(0.30)
(0.36)
n = 17
n = 15
n = 20
n = 52
0.11
-0.30
0.02
-0.02
High
(0.36)
(0.43)
(0.18)
(0.36)
n = 20
n = 12
n = 18
n = 50
0.12
-0.22
0.02
-0.01
Total
(0.35)
(0.41)
(0.25)
(0.36)
n = 37
n = 27
n = 38
n = 102
*TIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided by total
time, in seconds

Panel B - Means (Standard Deviations) of Dependent Variable – VIEWSTD**
Audit Guidance
Support
Oppose
Generate Own
Total
Estimation
Uncertainty
0.15
-0.16
-0.01
0.00
Low
(0.29)
(0.32)
(0.17)
(0.28)
n = 17
n = 15
n = 20
n = 52
0.16
-0.18
0.03
0.03
High
(0.29)
(0.35)
(0.18)
(0.30)
n = 20
n = 12
n = 18
n = 50
0.16
-0.17
0.01
0.02
Total
(0.29)
(0.32)
(0.17)
(0.29)
n = 37
n = 27
n = 38
n = 102
**VIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of opposing evidence
divided by total views

The information in Table 13 reveals that participants in the oppose condition
spent more time looking at disfavoring versus favoring evidence than did participants in
the support or generate own conditions. These participants also viewed more pieces of
disfavoring evidence versus favoring evidence than did participants in the support or
generate own conditions. Following their search strategies, participants in the oppose
condition also saved more pieces of disfavoring evidence versus favoring evidence in the
electronic work paper file than did the participants in the support and generate own
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conditions. Collectively, these patterns suggest that participants in the oppose condition
exhibited greater bias relative to participants in the support and generate own conditions.
A second factor influencing participants’ search strategies was the level of
uncertainty involved in the fair value estimate. As shown in Table 14, the extent of bias
in the oppose condition was greater when uncertainty was high. Specifically, participants
in the oppose/high uncertainty condition (1) spent more time viewing disfavoring versus
favoring evidence, (2) viewed more disfavoring versus favoring items, and (3) saved
more disfavoring versus favoring items of evidence to the electronic work paper file than
did participants in the oppose/low uncertainty condition.
Overall, this evidence suggests that both audit guidance and estimation
uncertainty affect the extent of bias when evaluating fair value estimates. Specifically, the
observed patterns of the means indicate that participants in the oppose-high uncertainty
condition exhibited the greatest bias relative to participants in all other conditions. While
these descriptive statistics indicate that the means are going in the expected directions,
the next section presents the formal tests of hypotheses.
4.3.5.2 Tests of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a (H1a) predicts that directional audit guidance increases bias in
auditor evaluation of management’s fair value estimate as the uncertainty associated with
the estimate increases from a low level to a high level. In other words, H1a predicts an
interactive effect of directional audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on bias. I use a
2 x 2 MANOVA to test this hypothesis. The first factor, Audit Guidance, is collapsed into
two levels: directional audit guidance (support and oppose) and non-directional audit
guidance (generate own). To form a single level of directional audit guidance, scores for
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the oppose condition are multiplied by a value of negative one. This transformation in the
oppose condition is necessary so that the magnitude of bias is not affected by the
direction of the bias when the two groups (support and oppose) are combined. Following
the transformation, values closer to zero are representative of a more balanced strategy,
whereas values further from zero indicate a biased approach evidence evaluation. The
MANOVA results for the dependent measures are presented in Panel A of Table 15. As
indicated in Table 15 Panel A, overall H1a (the interaction hypothesis) is not supported
(F=0.360, p=.782). Since the MANOVA provides no evidence of an interaction, the
ANOVA results are not interpreted.
Table 15: The Overall Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty on Bias
Panel A – Multivariate Results
Independent Variable:
F-Value1
p-value
Audit Guidance (AG)
3.880
.011
Estimation Uncertainty (EU)
0.309
.819
AG x EU
0.360
.782
Panel B – Univariate Results
Independent Variable:
df
SS
MS
F-Value
p-value
Audit Guidance
TIMESTDa
1
.507
.507
4.457
.037
b
VIEWSTD
1
.545
.545
7.835
.006
SAVEDc
1
154.157
154.517
8.106
.005
Estimation Uncertainty
TIMESTDa
1
.003
.003
.030
.863
VIEWSTDb
1
.014
.014
.198
.657
c
SAVED
1
.000
.000
.001
.977
AG x EU
TIMESTDa
1
.002
.002
.021
.886
b
VIEWSTD
1
.007
.007
.105
.747
SAVEDc
1
.051
.051
.154
.695
1
Wilks’ Lambda
a
TIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence
divided by total time, in seconds
b
VIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of
opposing evidence divided by total views
c
SAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
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Although the overall interaction of guidance and uncertainty is not significant,
hypothesis 1b (H1b) examines differences at the cell level, predicting that the
combination of disconfirm directional guidance and high uncertainty in management’s
fair value estimate will result in the greatest bias by auditors when evaluating the
estimate. Given that the interaction tested in H1a relied on combining support and oppose
manipulations into a single value, it is possible that the effect of the oppose manipulation
is being subsumed as a result of the combination. This possibility is somewhat supported
by the descriptive statistics reported in Tables 13 and 14. Therefore, H1b is tested using
a planned comparison. Results of the planned comparisons indicate that there is a
statistically significant difference between the oppose/high uncertainty group and all
other groups for TIMESTD (F(1,96)=1.978, p=.051) and SAVED (F(1,14.423)=3.720,
p=.002). Inspection of the means supports the prediction that bias is greatest in conditions
of high uncertainty and disconfirm directional guidance, thus H1b is supported.
Hypothesis 1c (H1c) and Hypothesis 1d (H1d) investigate the main effects of
audit guidance and estimation uncertainty, respectively. H1c predicts that auditors
presented with directional audit guidance will exhibit a greater magnitude of bias during
the evidential input phase relative to auditors presented with non-directional audit
guidance. The overall MANOVA test finds a significant effect of audit guidance
(F=3.600, p=.016). Results from univariate analysis to determine which dependent
variables were affected by audit guidance are presented in Table 15, Panel B. As
indicated in the table, audit guidance was significant for all three dependent variables:
TIMESTD (F=4.457, p=.037), VIEWSTD (F=7.835, p=.006), SAVED (F=8.381,
p=.005), thus H1c is supported.
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While not predicted, I also examine whether magnitude differences in bias exist
between the two types of directional audit guidance (support and oppose) and the nondirectional audit guidance (generate own). To test for these differences, I separated the
audit guidance variable into three levels (support, disconfirm, and generate own) and ran
a new 3 x 2 MANOVA model with audit guidance and estimation uncertainty as the
independent variables. In conformance with the results of H1c, the main effect of Audit
Guidance was significant (Wilks’ Lambda=.718, F=5.652, p=.000). Post hoc tests,
applying a Bonferroni adjustment, were used to determine where the differences between
groups occurred for each of the dependent variables. For TIMESTD, oppose was
significantly different from generate own (p=.054). A review of the means indicates that
the magnitude of bias was greater for participants in the disconfirm condition (mean =
-0.22) versus the generate own condition (mean = 0.02). The negative sign in front of the
mean for the disconfirm condition indicates a conservative bias, signifying that
participants’ bias was in the direction of disfavoring evidence versus favoring evidence.
Similarly, for VIEWSTD, oppose was significantly different from generate own (p=.056).
Again, the means indicate that bias was greater in the disconfirm (mean = -0.17) versus
generate own (mean = 0.01) condition. Generate own was also significantly different
from support (mean = 0.16, p=.058), suggesting that participants in the support condition
exhibited greater confirmation bias than those in the generate own condition. Lastly, for
SAVED, oppose was significantly different from generate own (p=.000) and support
(p=.001). Consistent with the results for TIMESTD, bias was greater in the disconfirm
condition (mean = -4.00) than the generate own condition (mean = -0.89) and the support
condition (mean = 0.16). Together, these results indicate that audit guidance directing the
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participant to oppose management’s fair value estimate leads to a greater extent of bias,
relative to audit guidance directing the participant to either support management’s
estimate or generate their own estimate. Furthermore, this bias is also a conservative bias
in that the bias results from a greater emphasis on disfavoring versus favoring evidence.
Hypothesis 1d (H1d) predicts that auditors evaluating a fair value estimate
involving high estimation uncertainty will exhibit a greater magnitude of bias than
auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving low estimation uncertainty. Contrary
to expectations, estimation uncertainty did not affect bias and H1d is not supported
(p=.529).
4.3.5.3 Sensitivity Analyses
A variety of sensitivity analyses were conducted to test the robustness of the
results. First, a separate MANOVA was conducted with only the auditor participants to
enhance the generalizability of the results. The MANOVA revealed non-significant
results for the effects of both audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on confirmation
bias. A power analysis revealed that the observed power was insufficient to detect a
relationship between the independent variables (audit guidance and estimation
uncertainty) and the dependent variables (TIMESTD, VIEWSTD, and SAVED). As
discussed in Section 4.2, insufficient power is likely due to the small sample size.
Second, supplemental analysis was conducted to determine whether the results are
driven by participants who did not pass the manipulation checks. The MANOVA
described in the prior analyses was repeated with only the participants who passed the
manipulation checks for both audit guidance and estimation uncertainty. The total
number of participants included in this analysis was 45. The results of the MANOVA
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indicate that neither audit guidance (F=3.124, p=.321) nor estimation uncertainty
(F=.079, p=.753) had a statistically significant effect on confirmation bias. These results,
however, are likely attributable to insufficient power due to the small sample size.
Specifically, the observed power of the effects of audit guidance and estimation
uncertainty were 30 percent and 12 percent, respectively.
Third, the dependent variables were standardized using different measures to test
the sensitivity of the results to the construction of the measures. The first measure
standardized the dependent variables by dividing each observation by 24 which
represented the total number of different evidence items that participants could view. The
second measure standardized the dependent variables by dividing each observation by 51
which represented the highest number of views recorded by a participant. The results of
the analyses with these alternative measures did not qualitatively differ from those
reported in Table 15.
As discussed previously, MANOVA may have multicollinearity problems when
the dependent variables are highly correlated. Since TIMESTD and VIEWSTD were
highly correlated (Pearson correlation = 0.906), three separate analysis of variances
(ANOVAs) were conducted. Consistent with results of the MANOVA, the separate
ANOVA results indicate that audit guidance was significant for all three dependent
variables: TIMESTD (F=4.457, p=.037); VIEWSTD (F=7.835, p=.006), and SAVED
(F=8.785, p=.004).
An alternative approach to dealing with multicollinearity is to create a new
dependent variable by combining the three dependent variables. Since the dependent
variables (TIMESTD, VIEWSTD, and SAVED) used different techniques for measuring
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confirmation bias it was necessary to scale the variables prior to their combination. Once
scaled and combined, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the new variable was .851
which indicates high internal consistency of the single measure of confirmation bias. An
ANOVA was run to determine the effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on
the single measure of confirmation bias. Consistent with the MANOVA, the results
indicate a significant main effect of audit guidance on confirmation bias (F=9.087,
p=.003).
4.4 Tests of Professional Skepticism Hypotheses (H2 and H3)
Hypothesis 2 tests whether bias observed during the evidence evaluation phase
affects skeptical judgment (JUDGE). Specifically, I expect that auditors exhibiting bias
during the evidential input phase will demonstrate low skeptical judgment while those
exhibiting conservative bias will demonstrate high skeptical judgment. Recall that
skeptical judgment is measured by asking participants to assess the risk that
management’s fair value estimate is materially misstated using a scale of one to nine,
where one is minimum risk and nine is maximum risk. Using linear regression, I test
whether each of the measures of confirmation bias (TIMESTD, VIEWSTD, and SAVED)
leads to skeptical judgment.
4.4.1 Assumptions of Regression
Visual inspection of a residuals plot detected a rectangular-shaped pattern, which
is indicative that the normality assumption has not been violated. An analysis of the
residual and predicted values indicates that the variances are relatively constant. Multiple
regression is sensitive to multicollinearity among the independent variables because it
limits the explanatory ability of these variables. The results of a Pearson correlation
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analysis, presented in Table 16, reveal that TIMESTD and VIEWSTD are highly
correlated (r=.906); therefore, the effects of the independent variables on the dependent
variable (JUDGE) were assessed individually using three different regressions. The
results of these regressions are presented in Table 17.
Table 16: Correlation Matrix for the Bias Independent Variables and Skeptical
Judgment Dependent Variable
Pearson Correlations (n=102)
TIMESTD
VIEWSTD
SAVED
JUDGE
TIMESTDa
1.000
.906**
.574**
-.005
b
VIEWSTD
1.000
.598**
-.030
SAVEDc
1.000
-.299**
JUDGEd
1.000
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
a

TIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided
by total time, in seconds
b
VIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of opposing
evidence divided by total views
c
SAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file minus
number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file
d
JUDGE = Risk that management’s fair value estimate is materially misstated (1= minimum risk
and 9 = maximum risk)
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Table 17: Regression Results for Skeptical Judgment
Panel A: JUDGEa = β0 + β1TIMESTD + ε
Variable
Beta
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
t-statistic
Intercept
28.173
TIMESTDb
-.005
-.049
2
Adjusted R
-.010
Panel B: JUDGE = β0 + β1VIEWSTD + ε
Variable
Beta
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
t-statistic
Intercept
28.169
VIEWSTDc
-.030
-.298
2
Adjusted-R
-.009
Panel C: JUDGE = β0 + β1SAVED + ε
Variable
Beta
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
t-statistic
Intercept
27.331
SAVEDd
-.299
-3.129
2
Adjusted-R
.080

p-value
.000
.961

p-value
.000
.766

p-value
.000
.002

a

JUDGE = Risk that management’s fair value estimate is materially misstated (1= minimum risk
and 9 = maximum risk)
b
TIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided
by total time, in seconds
c
VIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of opposing
evidence divided by total views
d
SAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file minus
number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file

4.4.2 Test of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 2 predicts that skeptical judgment is affected when auditors exhibit
bias during the evidential input phase. The results of the regressions indicate that only the
SAVED measure of bias was a significant explanatory variable of skeptical judgment (t=3.129, p=.002). The significant negative coefficient suggests that when auditors are
required to make a decision regarding the evidence they would save in a work paper file
to justify their actions, this behavior subsequently affects their skeptical judgment.
Interestingly, auditors’ search processes (i.e., TIMESTD and VIEWSTD) do not
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influence their skeptical judgment; rather, the requirement to “save” their evidence is the
influential factor on skeptical judgment.
The negative coefficient for SAVED suggests that there is an inverse relationship
between bias and skeptical judgment. In other words, as confirmation bias increases, the
level of skeptical judgment decreases. Of further interest in this study is whether
conservative bias (e.g., confirmation bias which favors disconfirming evidence versus
confirming evidence) increases skeptical judgment. Since confirmation bias in the
disconfirm condition is identified by a negative number, the inverse relationship suggests
that as conservative bias increases, the level of skeptical judgment increases. In summary,
these results provide only partial support for H2 since only the SAVED measure of bias
influenced skeptical judgment.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicts that auditors’ skeptical judgment leads to skeptical
action. Skeptical action was measured by the participant’s recommended dollar
adjustment to the client’s reported book value for the reacquired franchise rights. A
downward adjustment is evidence of skeptical action (ACTION).
To test H3, regression analysis was performed using the following model:
ACTION = β0 + β1JUDGE + ε. The results, reported in Table 18, indicate that as
predicted, skeptical action is influenced by skeptical judgment (t=-.3472, p=.001). Recall
that a downward adjustment is indicative of skeptical action, thus the negative Beta
coefficient supports the directional prediction that skeptical judgment leads to skeptical
action, thus H3 is supported.
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Table 18: Regression Results for Skeptical Action
Model: ACTIONa = β0 + β1JUDGE + ε
Variable
Beta
Predicted Sign
Coefficient
t-statistic
p-value
Intercept
2.058
.042
JUDGEb
-.328
-.3472
.001
2
Adjusted R
.099
a
ACTION = Skeptical action measured by the amount of recommended dollar adjustment
to management’s reported book value for reacquired franchise rights.
b
JUDGE = Skeptical judgment measured as the risk that management’s fair value
estimate is materially misstated (1= minimum risk and 9 = maximum risk)
4.4.3 Sensitivity Tests
Visual inspection of scatterplots for JUDGE indicated some slight
heteroscedasticity. Rank regressions, which are fairly robust to heteroscedasticity, were
utilized to test H2 and the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 17.
Visual inspections of histograms and scatterplots for ACTION indicated that the data
were not normally distributed and that this pattern was driven by a high concentration of
data points at zero. Further examination of the data revealed that 21 participants (72
percent) elected not to make an adjustment to management’s fair value estimate and four
participants (four percent) made upward adjustments to management’s estimate.
Although regression is robust to departures from normality, a rank regression was used to
test the robustness of the results. 11 Results of the rank regression are significant at a pvalue of .000, consistent with the results reported in Table 18.
Ideally, additional statistical techniques such as covariance-based structural
equation modeling (SEM) would be employed to test the entire model. Structural
equation modeling techniques may be a more powerful statistical method for testing the
hypothesis as those techniques allow for testing of all the relationships in the model
11

For the rank regression, upward dollar adjustments to management’s fair value estimate were interpreted
as non-skeptical judgment and were accordingly recoded as zero values.
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including direct and indirect effects of variables. However, these techniques generally
require very large sample sizes to render a specified model. Loehlin (1992) summarizes
results from studies which examined the effects of sample sizes on accuracy of estimation
and frequency of improper or nonconvergent models. Loehlin reports that with samples
of 100 or less, models experienced convergence failures, improper solutions (e.g.,
negative estimates of residual variance), and less precise estimates of the population
values. Loehlin recommends the use of 200 cases and at least three indicators per factor.
Similarly, Chin and Newsted (1999) warn that “when the latent variates are dependent, fit
indices tend to overreject models at sample sizes of 250 or less” (Hu and Bentler 1995,
95). Further, they warn that small sample sizes have the potential for Type II error in
which a poor model falsely achieves a good model fit and that small samples can lead to
poor parameter estimates and model test statistics (Chin and Newsted 1999).
An alternative to covariance-based SEM analysis is the variance-based approach
of partial least squares (PLS). Claims have been made that PLS can be a powerful method
of analysis when sample size is small. However, Monte Carlo studies have demonstrated
that this is not the case (Goodhue et al. 2007). Furthermore, “PLS shifts the orientation
from causal model/theory testing to component-based predictive modeling” (Chin and
Newsted 1999, 312). In other words, the goal of SEM is to obtain population parameter
estimates for explaining covariances under the assumption that the model is correct. On
the other hand, the goal of PLS is to create latent variable scores that can be used to
predict its own indicators or other latent variable (Chin and Newsted 1999).Given that the
goal of my study involves theory testing (i.e., Motivated Reasoning Theory) and causal

98

model testing (i.e., Nelson’s Professional Skepticism Model), PLS was not employed in
this context.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
5.1 Conclusions
Using professional auditors and undergraduate auditing students, this study
examined the effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on auditor judgment
and decision making in a fair value setting. The study predicted that directional audit
guidance and estimation uncertainty would individually and jointly affect confirmation
bias and, subsequently, professional skepticism when evaluating fair value estimates.
Following motivated reasoning theory, it was expected that directional audit guidance
(support/oppose management’s estimate) would lead the auditor to engage in greater bias
than non-directional audit guidance (generate own estimate). Further, according to
theories of ambiguity intolerance and negativity bias, it was expected that estimation
uncertainty would exacerbate this bias. Lastly, following Nelson’s (2009) professional
skepticism model, bias in evidential input was predicted to affect professional skepticism.
The findings support aspects of these expectations. The effects of both directional audit
guidance and estimation uncertainty on bias and, subsequently, professional skepticism
are summarized below.
Hypotheses 1a and 1b examined the joint effects of directional audit guidance and
estimation uncertainty on auditor confirmation bias. Specifically, H1a predicted that
directional audit guidance increases auditor bias in the evaluation of management’s fair
value estimate as the uncertainty in the estimate increases from a low level to a high
level. The interaction effect between audit guidance and estimation uncertainty predicted
in H1a was not supported. This result suggests that audit guidance and estimation
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uncertainty do not work in concert to affect confirmation bias; however, their joint effect
may have been masked by the method used to test the hypothesis. For instance, H1a
relied on combining the two levels of directional guidance (support and oppose) into a
single level, and it is possible that the differences at the individual cell levels were
masked by this combination of directional audit guidance into one level. Thus, H1b
examined differences in the individual cells. Specifically, H1b predicted that bias would
be greatest when audit guidance directed the auditor to disconfirm management’s
estimate and estimation uncertainty was high. H1b focuses on the disconfirm and high
uncertainty condition as this cell is expected to exhibit the greatest magnitude of
conservative bias, which would presumably alleviate concerns regarding the auditor’s
propensity to agree with management’s potentially biased estimate. Results support H1b
for the TIMESTD and SAVED bias variables, implying that participants were more
prone to exhibit bias in the time spent viewing evidence and the evidence saved to the
work paper file when they were directed to disconfirm management’s estimate and
estimation uncertainty was high. This bias was a conservative bias, in that participants
emphasized more opposing evidence than supporting evidence. This result has
implications for standard setters and practitioners who express concern over confirmatory
proneness in auditors as they evaluate fair value estimates of varying degrees of
uncertainty. Specifically, this result indicates that directional guidance focusing on
opposing management’s reported fair value estimate can shift the auditor’s focus from
supporting evidence to disconfirming evidence when estimation uncertainty is high.
While an interaction effect is detected in H1b, it remains of interest to investigate
whether audit guidance and estimation uncertainty individually affect bias in auditor
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review of fair value estimates. For example, the effects of directional audit guidance may
have implications for the review of fair value estimates, irrespective of the level of
uncertainty involved in the estimate reviewed. This information could be informative to
standard setters and firms who develop guidance for auditors via formal standards and
less formal practice guides.
H1c examined the individual main effect of audit guidance. Specifically, H1c
predicted that auditors presented with directional audit guidance would exhibit a greater
magnitude of bias than auditors presented with non-directional guidance. To test this
hypothesis, the two levels of directional guidance (i.e., support/oppose management’s
estimate) were combined into one level and then compared to the level of non-directional
guidance (e.g., generate own estimate). This main effect of audit guidance was supported
for all three dependent variables: TIMESTD (measured as the time spent on supporting
evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided by total time), VIEWSTD
(measured as the number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of
opposing evidence divided by total views), and SAVED (measured as the number of
confirming evidence items minus number of opposing evidence items saved to an
electronic work paper file). While this finding supports H1c, it does not provide
information about which type of directional audit guidance leads to the greatest bias. A
review of the means in each guidance condition indicates a conservative bias in the
disconfirm condition. Post hoc analyses confirm that bias in the oppose condition was
greater than the degree of bias in the generate own condition for all three dependent
variables. In addition, bias in the support condition was greater than the degree of bias in
the generate own condition for only VIEWSTD. In summary, these findings suggest that
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bias is greatest when audit guidance directs the auditor to oppose management’s estimate
and that this bias shifts the auditors’ search strategy from a confirming approach to a
more conservative approach that emphasizes disconfirming evidence. Further, little
difference was found between audit guidance directing the auditor to support
management’s estimate and guidance directing the auditor to generate their own estimate.
Collectively, these results suggest that requiring an auditor to generate his or her own
estimate may not be an effective remedy for decreasing bias in auditors; however,
requiring an auditor to oppose management’s estimate shifts the bias to a conservative
bias. Thus, constituents such as the PCAOB who are interested in increasing auditor
professional skepticism during the audit of fair value estimates may view the instruction
to disconfirm management’s estimate as a vehicle to heighten skepticism via this
conservative bias. This possibility was explored further in H2 and H3, but first the main
effect of estimation uncertainty is discussed.
H1d predicted that auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving high
uncertainty would exhibit a greater magnitude of bias than auditors evaluating a fair
value estimate involving low estimation uncertainty. This hypothesis was not supported.
Given the uncertain nature of fair value estimation in general, and the low levels of fair
value experience represented in the sample of participants, it is possible that the
uncertainty manipulation was not salient to participants. In other words, auditors may
perceive little difference in levels of uncertainty when dealing with a fair value estimate
involving many assumptions, even when those assumptions involve differences in
uncertainty. Interestingly, interviews with partners at Big Four firms indicated that
auditors become involved in fair value auditing as early as the staff level, and it is
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possible that early in their careers, auditors will perceive fair value auditing as an
ambiguous task, regardless of the actual degree of uncertainty inherent in the estimate.
Further research with a more select sample of auditors will provide more insight into the
effects of estimation uncertainty on confirmation bias. For example, a sample including
auditors at both low levels (e.g., staff) and high levels (e.g., partners) may provide insight
into whether experience influences auditors’ perceptions of and reactions to varying
levels of estimation uncertainty. A larger sample may also detect differences that were
not observed in this study because of low statistical power.
Overall, the results of H1a, b, c, and d should be of interest to standard setters and
accounting firms as they consider the development of guidance for evaluating fair value
estimates. Although bias is generally considered to be a deficiency in judgment and
decision making (JDM) it is possible that bias (e.g., conservative bias) can have positive
effects on other aspects of the audit, including auditors’ professional skepticism.
Accordingly, Hypotheses 2 and 3 investigated the effects of confirmation (conservative)
bias on auditor professional skepticism.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that auditors’ bias during the evidential input phase would
affect auditors’ skeptical judgment. This hypothesis was partially supported as only one
of the measures of bias (i.e. SAVED) was significant. This finding suggests that when
auditors are required to make a decision regarding which pieces of evidence to save in a
work paper file as support for their recommendations, bias exhibited in the saving process
affects auditors’ skeptical judgment. This relationship makes intuitive sense as judgment
is inherently involved in making a decision to save to the work paper file. However, it
raises the question of whether there is a recursive relationship between actions taken
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during the evidential input phase and skeptical judgment. This study finds that auditor
bias in evidence saved to the work paper file affects auditors’ skeptical judgment. Thus,
auditors exhibiting confirmation (conservative) bias exercise lower (higher) skeptical
judgment. This finding, when combined with the results of H1c, suggests that directional
audit guidance directing the auditor to oppose management’s estimate can increase
conservative bias in the evidential input phase, thereby increasing skeptical judgment in
the evaluation of fair value estimates.
Hypothesis 3 examines whether skeptical judgment leads to skeptical action.
Consistent with Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model, this hypothesis is
supported. Collectively, H2 and H3 provide evidence that confirmation bias can have a
positive effect on auditors’ professional skepticism. Specifically, auditors exhibit
conservative bias, wherein the auditor focuses on more disfavoring than favoring
evidence, and professional skepticism is elevated. Together, the findings of this study
provide evidence toward Nelson’s (2009) call for research investigating whether
confirmation bias can be exploited to increase professional skepticism. Based on the
results of this study, directional audit guidance, which orients the auditor towards a
disconfirming approach, leads to higher professional skepticism in the evaluation of fair
value estimates.
5.2 Contributions
The findings of this study have important implications for standard setters and
audit firms as they develop guidance for the audit of fair value estimates. Much of the
debate regarding the veracity of fair value reporting rests on the auditor’s ability to
provide assurance as to the representational faithfulness of the estimate. This study
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provides evidence that current audit guidance directing an auditor to support
management’s fair value estimates leads to a confirmation bias, wherein the auditor
favors supporting versus disconfirming evidence. Further, this confirmation bias leads to
decreased professional skepticism. This finding validates opponents’ concerns that fair
value reporting could result in misstated fair values if management’s estimate is biased.
The results also show that non-directional guidance telling the auditor to generate his or
her own estimate leads to a less biased search than either of the directional guidance
conditions (e.g., support or disconfirm management’s estimate). This finding is consistent
with motivated reasoning theory, and offers the profession insight when considering the
effects of alternative wording in audit guidance on auditor bias.
This study also directly answers a call for research in the professional skepticism
literature. Nelson (2009) urges researchers to investigate whether confirmation bias can
be exploited to increase professional skepticism in auditors. As predicted, this study
provides evidence that confirmation bias can be used to favor professional skepticism by
changing the focus of directional guidance from a confirming focus to a disconfirming
focus. Specifically, when auditors are directed to oppose management’s estimate, they
exhibit a conservative bias, wherein they favor disconfirming evidence over confirming
evidence, and this bias increases professional skepticism. These results, however, do not
provide information regarding the effects of confirmation (conservative) bias on the
efficiency of the audit. Thus, standard setters and audit firms should consider the results
in combination with other objectives of the audit. Further, the results are subject to
limitations that are inherent in the experimental approach. These limitations are discussed
in section 5.3.

106

The findings of this study also have implications for judgment and decision
making research. Bonner (2008) suggests that judgment and decision research should
extend beyond the study of judgment biases and should also identify remedies for such
biases or situations where the bias can have positive effects on JDM. This study extends
judgment and decision making research by providing an example of how confirmation
bias can be optimized to have positive effects on auditors’ skeptical judgment and
skeptical action. The question remains, however, whether professional skepticism can
actually be heightened to an extent that it leads to an inefficient audit. Additionally, the
implications of this study are predicated on the potential for management’s fair value
estimates to be biased. In other words, if management’s estimates are in fact reliable, then
it could be argued that a confirmation bias would lead to a more efficient audit. The
weakness in this argument is that the auditor does not know a priori whether
management’s estimate is reliable, thus exercising professional skepticism in the audit of
the fair value estimate is critical.
5.3 Limitations
Due to the experimental approach utilized in the study, this research is subject to a
number of limitations. First, to increase the internal validity of the study, the fair value
task excluded additional information typically available to auditors when making fair
value judgments. It is therefore possible that additional factors may be present in the
auditing environment which would either mitigate or exacerbate the effects of
confirmation bias on professional skepticism.
Second, it is likely that the manipulation of estimation uncertainty was not salient
to the participants. While pilot testing provided evidence that the manipulation was
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effective, only 66 percent of participants passed the manipulation check in the main
experiment. Given the nature of the experiment (i.e., fair value estimation of a Level 3
fair value), it is likely that even the low uncertainty condition was perceived as a highly
uncertain situation for participants. Additionally, the experimental materials provided
sensitivity ranges reflecting management’s consideration of alternative assumptions or
outcomes. The range for the low uncertainty condition provided a spread of $5,124,500
which represented nearly 24 percent of the total fair value estimate. Thus, it is possible
that this range was too large and that participants perceived the estimate as one that
involved high uncertainty. These issues potentially suggest that the results of the
experiment may not be representative of real differences in confirmation bias which may
exist between fair values of low versus high uncertainty.
Third, the small sample size may have contributed to low power in the statistical
approaches utilized. A larger sample would allow for more powerful statistical techniques
such as structural equation modeling to be utilized. Structural equation modeling has the
advantage of testing all of the relationships in the model including direct and indirect
effects of the constructs within the model. This approach would provide more compelling
evidence regarding the total effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on both
confirmation bias and professional skepticism exercised in the audit of fair value
estimates.
Last, participants may have lacked the knowledge necessary to make fair value
judgments. While interviews with partners from Big Four firms and regional firms
revealed that even staff auditors are involved in the audit of fair values, the
demographical analysis indicated that participants had very little (if any) experience with
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auditing fair values. This factor might explain why so few participants recommended an
adjustment to management’s fair value estimate. In other words, participants may have
opted not to make an adjustment to management’s fair value estimate out of convenience
because of a lack of confidence in their own fair value knowledge. Further research is
needed to determine whether this lack of experience was an artifact of the students and
auditors included in the sample, or whether it is representative of the lack of knowledge
and confidence held by auditors in general. Post-experimental discussions with
professional auditors and valuators suggest that the audit profession as a whole is lacking
confidence and experience in fair value judgments.
5.4 Future Research
The results of this study provide avenues for future research in the area of auditor
judgment and decision making as it relates to the evaluation of fair value estimates.
Auditors commonly face countervailing incentives during an audit engagement, including
the requirement to comply with auditing standards, and time pressures to complete the
audit efficiently. While the results of my study indicate that directional audit guidance
increases professional skepticism when it shifts the focus of the auditors’ search from a
confirmatory to a disconfirmatory approach, it is possible that this shift leads to an
inefficient audit. A future extension of my study includes an examination of the overall
differences in time spent viewing evidence to determine whether directional guidance and
estimation uncertainty affect the overall efficiency of the audit. Similarly, while the
primary purpose of this study was not to determine the optimal level of professional
skepticism, future research could investigate the effects of total search time on
professional skepticism.
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Bonner (2008) suggests that auditors may be less susceptible to confirmation bias
during the information search phase because their requirements to exercise professional
skepticism may make them focus more on negative information. Thus, it is possible that
there is in fact a recursive relationship in Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model
wherein skeptical judgment influences evidential input. Future analyses could investigate
whether skeptical judgment influences evidence search. In addition, it is possible that
audit guidance and estimation uncertainty affect professional skepticism, irrespective of
evidence search. Future path analyses could investigate the direct and indirect links
between audit guidance, estimation uncertainty, bias in evidential search, and
professional skepticism.
Future research could also investigate whether the source of evidence influences
auditors’ professional skepticism when evaluating fair value estimates. In other words, a
study could be designed to determine the relative weights that auditors give to internallygenerated evidence versus externally-generated evidence when making fair value
judgments and decisions. Similarly, future research could investigate whether auditors’
decisions are influenced when a valuation specialist is involved in reviewing the estimate
and whether judgments and decisions are influenced by whether the specialist is
employed by the client versus the audit firm. Further, future research could investigate
whether differences in auditor JDM emerge when the auditor reviews quantitative versus
qualitative evidence.
Finally, various covariates supported by theory and prior research were included
in the study; however, none proved to be significant explanatory variables of
confirmation bias as expected. Future research should seek to explain why covariates that
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have been shown to affect auditor behavior in situations of uncertainty did not influence
auditor JDM in a fair value setting.
Through exploring some of the suggestions discussed above, researchers will gain
further insight into the direct and indirect effects of confirmation (conservative) bias on
professional skepticism, as well as other aspects of the audit. These future studies could
further enhance our understanding of the effects of bias and professional skepticism on
the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit, as these areas were not touched on by the
results of this study.
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APPENDIX A: PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM SCALE
Skepticism Scale and Instructions for administration (Hurtt 2007)

Statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Please circle the response
that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too
much time on any one statement.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
I often accept other peoples’ explanations without
further thought...................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6

I feel good about myself. .......................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I wait to decide on issues until I can get more information ...1

2

3

4

5

6

The prospect of learning excites me. .....................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I am interested in what causes people to behave
the way that they do ......................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I am confident of my abilities ................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I often reject statements unless I have proof that they are
true ................................................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

Discovering new information is fun ......................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I take my time when making decisions .................................. 1 2

3

4

5

6

I tend to immediately accept what other people tell me ........1

2

3

4

5

6

Other peoples’ behavior doesn’t interest me .........................1

2

3

4

5

6

I am self-assured ....................................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

My friends tell me that I usually question things that I see
or hear ...........................................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I like to understand the reason for other peoples’ behavior ...1

2

3

4

5

6

I think that learning is exciting ..............................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I usually accept things I see, read or hear at face value .........1

2

3

4

5

6

I don’t feel sure of myself ......................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I usually notice inconsistencies in explanations ....................1

2

3

4

5

6

Most often I agree with what the others in my group think ...1

2

3

4

5

6

I dislike having to make decisions quickly ............................1

2

3

4

5

6

I have confidence in myself ...................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I don’t like to decide until I’ve looked at all of the readily
available information ....................................................1

2

3

4

5

6
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Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I like searching for knowledge ...............................................1

2

3

4

5

6

I frequently question things that I see or hear ........................1

2

3

4

5

6

It is easy for other people to convince me .............................1

2

3

4

5

6

I seldom consider why people behave in a certain way .........1

2

3

4

5

6

I like to ensure that I’ve considered most available
information before making a decision ..........................1
I enjoy trying to determine if what I read or hear is true .......1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

I relish learning ......................................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

The actions people take and the reasons for those actions
are fascinating ...............................................................1

2

3

4

5

6

Skepticism Scale Instructions:
This is a 30 item scale that normally takes less than 5 minutes to administer. I normally
explain that the scale is used to measure differences in individual characteristics and that
there are no right or wrong answers.
Items 1, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26 are reverse scored. (Subtract the score from 7 and use
the reversed number in summing the total score.)
Scale scores can range from 30 – 180. Student scores have tended to fall within the 90 –
150 range and higher scores equate to greater skepticism.
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APPENDIX B: AMBIGUITY INTOLERANCE SCALE
Ambiguity Intolerance Scale and Scoring Instructions (Budner 1962)
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which you agree or
disagree with them.
Strongly
Disagree
An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer
probably doesn’t know much. ........................................1

I would like to live in a foreign country for a while ..............1
There is really no such thing as a problem that can’t
be solved. ......................................................................1
People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss
most of the joy of living ................................................1
A good job is one where what is to be done and how it
is to be done is always clear ..........................................1
It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to
solve a simple one .........................................................1
In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling
small simple problems rather than large and
complicated ones. ..........................................................1
Often the most interesting and stimulating people are
those who don’t mind being different and original. ...... 1
What we are used to is always preferable to what is
unfamiliar. .....................................................................1
People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know
how complicated things really are. ...............................1
A person who leads an even, regular life in which few
surprises or unexpected happening arise really has
a lot to be grateful for....................................................1
Many of our most important decisions are based upon
insufficient information. ...............................................1
I like parties where I know most of the people more
than ones where all or most of the people are
complete strangers. .......................................................1
Teachers and supervisors who hand out vague assignments
give one a chance to show initiative and originality. ....1
The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the
better. ............................................................................1
A good teacher or supervisor is one who makes you
wonder about your way of looking at things. ...............1

Strongly
Agree

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6 7
6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

2

3

4

5

6 7

Scoring Instructions: The even numbered items must be reverse-scored. The sum of all 16
items represents the total score. High scores indicate a greater intolerance of ambiguity.
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
Experimental Condition: Oppose Management’s Estimate/High Estimation
Uncertainty
Dear auditor:

eIRB#: ( Pro00000980 )

My name is Norma Montague and I am a Ph.D. student in the School of Accountancy at
the University of South Florida. I would like to request your participation in a research
study related to “Auditing Fair Value Estimates.” This research is extremely timely can
help advance knowledge in both the academic and audit areas. This research study is
being conducted as part of my dissertation and I would really appreciate your
participation in the study.
To participate, I will ask you to evaluate an issue pertaining to a hypothetical public
client’s intangible asset account. You will be asked to evaluate the client’s fair value
estimate for the intangible asset by reviewing the client’s assumptions as well as evidence
available to the client when making the assumptions.
The case should take no more than 30 minutes. Your participation is voluntary and your
identity will be kept confidential.
Below is a link to the study. It will be necessary for you to use Internet Explorer as your
browser in order to access the study.
Please enter the following access code on the initial screen.
Access Code: pyr921
Entering this access code and proceeding past the initial screen indicates consent to
participate in the study.
If you have any questions, please direct your requests to:
Norma R. Montague
University of South Florida
4202 E. Fowler Avenue, BSN 3403
Tampa, Florida 33620
(813) 974-7340
nmontagu@usf.edu

Link to Study: http://forecast-study.com/research/
Thank you for your participation!
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The Audit Task was varied to reflect the various experimental conditions as follows:
Support Management’s Estimate/Low Uncertainty Condition:

139

Oppose Management’s Estimate/Low Uncertainty Condition:

140

Generate Own Estimate/Low Uncertainty Condition:

141

Support Management’s Estimate /High Uncertainty Condition:

142

Generate Own Estimate/High Uncertainty Condition:

143

Evidence items in the Low Uncertainty Condition:

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

The student participant survey was identical to the auditor participant survey with the
exception of the two following screens:
Student Survey: Introduction Page

Student survey: Demographical questions
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